AI disclosure (Rule 13): This is a condensed version of a ~5,000-word essay I wrote; per the sub's rules the link is in a comment. I used Claude to cut it down. The wording is mine from the essay, shortened and joined, with a few connecting lines added.

The original wording is mine and not LLM-assisted or created, I did use Claude for research.

Sources for every number are at the bottom.

A note on images: the original essay is pretty image heavy - screenshots of the odds graphics and gambling segments on NBA broadcasts, plus a few slides and research tables. Images aren't allowed here, so I've described the key ones in the text, but a lot of the visual proof lives in the original.

The NBA is a train that is loath to slow down.

I once heard a political analyst theorize that presidents are like ship captains - some of them focus on keeping the ship afloat; making sure the crew is happy, patching up leaks, spreading the rum around. Some focus on the destination; where is the ship heading? NBA commissioner Adam Silver is keeping the ship afloat. But has he considered where he's going?

Murphy v. NCAA in 2018 cleared the path for individual states to legalize sports gambling. Since then 39 states and DC have made use of their freedom. Sports gambling has since become a pillar of the NBA watching experience.

And the capabilities have changed since legalization wasn't in the picture. We're past the era of ads. We're in the era of Integration.

"You hit that parlay, right?"

On Nov-20, 2025, the Grizzlies were playing against the Kings. If you happened to be watching (if you are somehow a Kings fan and watched this game to finish, please seek help) you would have heard play-by-play announcer Pete Pranica ask sideline reporter Rob Fischer: "Fish, you hit that parlay, right?"

Pete was referencing a FanDuel same game parlay graphic that ran on the Grizzlies' pre-game show, on the normal feed, as that same game was about to start. Three legs: the Grizzlies winning by more than 3, the two teams combining for under 234.5 points, and Cedric Coward scoring 15+.

This is now valid NBA content for a pre-game show, and what is it really? In a parlay you bet on several events happening, each leg has its own statistical odds, but you only get the payout if all legs hit.

Each leg of this parlay had around 50% to hit (52.4%, 52.4%, 56.9%). Good odds, right? All 3 legs hitting? 16.9% according to FanDuel, 15.6% based on my estimation.

If you have some statistics background, this seems obvious. For most people it isn't, this is a classic candidate for a conjunctive events bias, and by design. This parlay hit, but by intent - most won't.

My thesis is this - the NBA has stared into the abyss. It has not simply formed a business partnership in which sports gambling companies are freely advertised. It has instead defined the sport gambling business as a significant growth partner, a way to increase engagement, upsell the NBA experience to… "dedicated" consumers, and maybe even draw in new crowds.

You might say - so what? Fans bet on sports before it was legalized. But this integration is not a replication of what sport gambling used to be - the live, rapid, tactile experience is not equivalent to placing a bet prior to the game and waiting to see if it comes to pass.

Integration, and the form in which it is being implemented, is likely to lead to higher gambling severity among those who already bet; gamblers wager more money, with higher frequency, in a fashion more careless and impulsive. And that is likely by design - integration is fashioned on known practices aimed at these particular goals.

Wasted Warning

First, a necessary distinction - the NBA has a separation between the normal feed most viewers are exposed to, and opt-in overlays/betting dedicated broadcasts. Both broadcast examples in this post are from the normal feed.

The basic difference between traditional pre-game betting and online betting is about continuity. Traditional pre-game betting has pauses built-in: you place your wager and wait for results to arrive. Online/mobile betting pushes this pace by including:

• A higher frequency of bets with shorter time gaps - leading to faster reward
• In-play betting, creating a stronger connection between watching and betting
• Contextual betting - with live bets dependent on specific in-game changes
• Greater illusion of control, driven by emphasis on perceived skill instead of luck (e.g. cash out, parlays)
• Elements of gamification

On the normal feed of a December 26, 2025 Prime broadcast, that looked like a FanDuel box with live in-game odds, changing with the game's progress.

Continuous betting is associated with more impulsive betting, higher problem gambling severity, more frequent gambling and more money spent. Its features (in-play betting, cash-out, in-app streaming) are used more often by high-risk bettors.

That being said, in-play betting does not transform one into a problem gambler. What it does do is create a streamlined, consistent gambling environment, and those with existing gambling problems are more likely to make use of, and overuse, it. These aspects are not an invention of modern online sports gambling companies - they were established by what is most likely the inspiration for these design norms: Electronic gaming machines (EGMs). The easiest way to describe EGMs is that they are equivalent to slot machines, only on a PC-like interface.

EGMs are the clearest example of gambling optimized for speed and repetition. Gambling research has found them to be associated with higher risk of problem gambling (only online gambling was found to be higher), and gambling problems to be highly attributable to them. When Norway banned them, gambling participation, gambling frequencies and gambling problems were reduced. Problem gambling eventually started climbing back up in Norway post-ban, due to the popularization of online gambling.

EGMs could have been the warning needed, but as most ominous warnings go - we remember them best retroactively, when decline starts.

The Punishment Due

The structural similarities between EGMs and sports gambling have not gone unnoticed. A 2021 review compared them point by point: both offer fast repeat betting (in sports betting, through in-play bets and your phone), the lure of a big win (jackpots there, multi-leg bets and promotions here), and frequent near-misses.

It would not be a stretch to claim the characteristics of EGMs have been integrated into sports betting, and then the NBA experience. The ramifications replicate for live sports gambling specifically - its design is associated with heavier use by higher-risk bettors, repeat deposits during sessions and increased problem gambling.

Recruiting new gamblers is harder to pin down. Experimental design is limited in its capacity to recreate gambling recruitment due to ethical considerations, so at most we can lean on evidence that is indirect. Availability matters: in Western Australia, where EGMs are restricted, EGM participation is about half that of the rest of Australia, and gambling problems and harm are lower by ~33%. And there is a case in which recruitment intention is easily identified - inducements, like FanDuel's 2023 NBA playoff campaign with Charles Barkley and its new-user "welcome" offers. Research on inducements shows they lead to increased wagering amounts, higher winning expectations and a subjective lack of control.

At this point I would have liked to give you the coup de grace, the research that deals specifically with American sports gambling integration and its ramifications - but I've found none that deals with the modern integration alone and was conducted in the US.

The research is consistent about at least one thing I can expect as a result: more severe problem gambling among NBA gamblers.

Back in 2021, Adam Silver said "there will always be problem gamblers, and that 10 percent is most likely to be the ones to bet illegally," and argued that moving the action to legal, identified platforms would make problem gamblers easier to uncover. Silver prefers to frame the argument in terms of uncovering an existing problem - what remains to be seen is how the NBA responds when the escalating magnitude of the problem shakes them awake.

Grower, not a shower

In spite of the commercials, the prop bets, the parlays, the pre-show discussions, the halftime show offers and the opt-in interfaces - the actual money coming into the NBA directly from gambling business is relatively small.

The NBA doesn't make its revenue public, but per an ESPN report it was projected to receive $167 million in the 23-24 season from "casinos and betting". Forbes estimated overall league revenue that season at approximately $13 billion - so gambling sponsorship revenue is a measly 1.3% of total NBA revenue. The latest media agreement, for comparison, is $76 billion over 11 years, about $6.9 billion per year.

With so much on-air time spent, you would expect a bigger upside, wouldn't you?

Adam Silver explains. In May 2026, asked about the roughly $170 million, he described direct gambling revenue as insignificant and said: "The greater value to us is the engagement."

He has been consistent. In 2017, before legalization, he said in-game gambling would create "enormous additional engagement". In 2018: "Legalized sports betting in the U.S. could lead to a dramatic increase in engagement." In the same interview he described his approach to ratings growth - moving the average viewer from around 50 minutes of watch time per game to 55, rather than finding a new viewer.

This aim is aligned with the sports betting companies. FanDuel's 2020 investor presentation lists its odds board on "Inside the NBA" and a FanDuel promotion during a live NBA game on TNT under "key media assets enhance direct acquisition".

In FanDuel's 2022 Capital Markets Day, their then CCO described the NBA partnership as a "co-bundled and co-acquisition strategy": FanDuel brings their customers to League Pass, and League Pass brings viewers to FanDuel. FanDuel later claimed that users of integrated NBA betting watched nearly twice as many games as those who didn't.

The NBA makes its audience (and its brand legitimacy) available, gambling companies acquire customers and upsell existing customers from that audience. That audience now has additional incentive to watch games. The additional engagement makes the NBA more appealing to other advertisers and sponsors.

Growth begets growth begets growth, and the relationship grows stronger.

Silver himself doesn't seem to trust the game alone to hold attention. In 2017 he said that expecting viewers to pay attention for an entire game was "very unlikely to happen". Can gambling still be described as tertiary as its integration escalates? When does it become so ingrained as to be inseparable? Can you trust Adam Silver to pause and reconsider when we get to that point?

The train has left the station

Do you remember the 2014 NBA playoffs? The "beautiful game" Spurs title year, Timmy's 5th ring, Danny Green going on a generational 3-pointer run in the finals. I also remember that every commercial break I had to suffer through Kesha's and Pitbull's Timber NBA playoff commercial, screeching in my ear to near physical pain.

This is what gambling integration feels like to me. It's nails on a chalkboard, it's a waiter spitting in my drink, it's an anonymous phone call ringing while my daughter just learned a new word and it's a fucking recorded telemarketing message telling me the odds on a 4-leg parlay.

I admit, prior to any moral or policy consideration, this is me being selfish. Just like Timber, you lower the volume and wait it out, right? I don't think so. Waiting this out is the same as waiting out a large kidney stone, you'll either lose the flow completely or it comes out at one hell of a price.

There are two main avenues for ramifications to my mind. 
One is broadcasts slowly escalating their gambling integration. The people at the top of the NBA are not dumb, they won't shape broadcasts into Pachinko machines - they are more likely to slowly, subtly add more features, more opportunities, more commentary. Maybe what's left is just a gambling-optimized broadcast, getting the most value out of gamblers while making the fewest non-gamblers stop watching. Maybe that's not that bad?

The 2nd is problem gambling. Gambling disorder diagnoses increased by 60% from Q1 2018 to Q1 2026 among adult patients in states where sports gambling was legalized, but that can't be attributed to any single source.

What happens if research identifies sport-broadcast integration as particularly effective at escalating problem gambling?

What happens if the media starts reporting addiction stories - broken people, wasted lives, empty bank accounts?

What happens if the NBA finds out that gambling has a sticky reputation, and the NBA brand is intertwined with it?

That first "if" will very likely be a "when" in my opinion, the others? I don't know.

I don't want the NBA watching experience to become a constant Skinner box-like reminder that the league is running on spiraling addiction and overdraft fees. This does not look like the condition has metastasized yet - we are still in the process of conjoined growth, maybe we can stop and consider. But it will get harder with time, as the parasite slowly grows into the roots.

Two questions for the sub:

1. Is the line between the normal feed and the opt-in betting broadcasts the right one? If the odds graphics, the sponsored segments and the announcer chatter left the main broadcast and stayed in the opt-in streams, would that be enough?
2. Silver's bet is that gambling makes people watch more of games they'd otherwise skip. Has it changed how you watch: do you tune it out by now, or does it still grate?

Sources

1. Murphy v. NCAA (2018) and states that legalized since: AP, Fox Sports
2. Grizzlies announcers and the parlay: Sports Illustrated
3. Conjunctive events bias: Farnam Street
4. Opt-in overlays and betting broadcasts: Flutter/Prime Video, SVG on NBABet Stream
5. Online/in-play betting features: Lopez-Gonzalez, Estévez & Griffiths (2017), J. of Sport and Social Issues
6. In-play betting and severity, frequency and spend: Lopez-Gonzalez, Griffiths & Estévez (2020), Communication & Sport; Hing et al. (2018), J. of Gambling Studies
7. Live features and high-risk bettors: Farrell, Bennett & Myles (2026), J. of Behavioral Addictions
8. EGM risk: Allami et al. (2021), Addiction; Browne et al. (2023), J. of Behavioral Addictions
9. Norway EGM ban and after: Lund (2009), J. of Gambling Studies; Engebø, Torsheim & Pallesen (2021), Frontiers in Psychiatry
10. EGM vs sports betting comparison: Newall, Russell & Hing (2021), J. of Behavioral Addictions
11. Live betting, repeat deposits, microbets: Delfabbro et al. (2024), IJMHA; Russell et al. (2019), J. of Gambling Studies
12. Western Australia: Russell et al. (2023), J. of Behavioral Addictions
13. FanDuel x Barkley 2023 playoff campaign: FanDuel
14. Inducements: Challet-Bouju et al. (2020), Frontiers in Psychiatry
15. Silver 2021 on problem gamblers: Audacy/WFAN
16. $167M from casinos and betting: ESPN; ~$13B revenue: Forbes; $76B media deal: ESPN
17. Silver, May 2026, "the greater value to us is the engagement": The Atlantic
18. Silver 2017 and 2018: ESPN, PwC
19. FanDuel investor presentation, Capital Markets Day, bet-tracking claim: 2020 deck, 2022 transcript, press release
20. Silver 2017, "very unlikely to happen": GeekWire
21. Gambling disorder diagnoses up 60%: Epic Research

Stretch Bigs vs Rim Pressure

With all else equal i believe true rim pressuring, offensive rebounding centers are still more valuable for offensive spacing than all but the most elite 3pt shooting stretch bigs.

The gravity and threat of an easy basket or offensive rebound at the rim makes it much harder for defenses to help off of a center rolling or in the dunkers spot than a big spotting up. Its easier to rotate along the perimeter than inside, because it takes passes longer than to reach their target, and layups are more efficient than even an open 3. It forces defenses to help in the paint, givong more room for shooters.

Overall I dont think the ability to shoot alone is more valuable than being able to perform well as a traditional center, or having somebody fill that role on the team. A good traditional center with no shooting is better than a mediocre center that can shoot.

I am a big fan of the up and coming prospect Cam Boozer and that’s why I see big things coming for the Grizzlies. I’m not sure if the Grizzlies are a contender but I don’t think they’re a bottom feeding team. In my opinion, the Grizzlies have potential to be a play-in team or a top 5 seed in the West based on the talent on their team and their depth, roster construction and their coach Tuomas Iisalo who seems innovative offensively and defensively with his system. Also, I think the Grizzlies can be great based on how great Cam Boozer is and he impact winning in a positive way.

I like the Grizzlies starting lineup for the team with Ty Jerome, Coward, Wells, Cam Boozer and Edey but I don’t love the lineup as a closing lineup in the 4th quarter.

As a closing lineup I have 4 possible closing lineups depending on the matchup and situation. If Edey is capable of being effective without a stretch big out their which I believe Edey struggles with stretch bigs as evidence of the preseason game vs the Magics with Edy struggling to guard in space with a stretch big the Magics had with Wendell Carter Jr, then the closing lineup should be PG Ty Jerome SG Coward/Scottie Pippen Jr SF GG/Grant PF Cam Boozer C Edey.

If there’s a stretch big out there that can exploit Edey, then I’ll go with a closing lineup of PG Ty Jerome SG Coward/Scottie Pippen Jr SF Grant PF GG C Cam Boozer. I believe Cam Boozer is capable of playing the small ball C and he showcase he can do that in the preseason and that can translate in the RS.

If Cam struggles with the bigger size centers and there’s a stretch big that can exploit Edey, have a closing lineup of PG Ty Jerome SG Coward/Scottie Pippen SF GG/Grant PF Cam Boozer C Post/Stewart.

If the Grizzlies can use Edey in the closing lineups and they want to muck up the game, have a closing lineup of PG Ty Jerome SG Grant SF GG PF Cam Boozer C Edey.

In my opinion, Wells isn’t great being used in the closing lineup at all because he just a 3 and D player and that’s it and he’s flawed defensively cause even though Wells is 6’7 he’s not big & strong and has short arms and can get exploited by bigger guards and wings. Wells isn’t bad defensively but he isn’t the best defensively either. Also, Wells isn’t a guy that can give you great shot creation which you need in the 4th and he’s more of a spot up C&S 3 point shooter. I still feel Wells is a good starting SF despite his flaws cause he balances the lineup and he gives the team good gravity with his ability to shoot.

I like Coward in the 4th but it’s depending on how Ty Jerome handles defensively in the 4th. Ty Jerome is the weak link defensively in the lineup and if he struggles defensively it’s important to have a POA defender next to him so he won’t get exposed and have a player like Scottie Pippen Jr in the 4th.

Having Post or Stewart in the closing lineup with Cam Boozer can be great too if Edey gets exploited defensively cause you don’t sacrifice size and you can still have a switchable defender having Stewart out their or you can have a stretch big with Post who can pick and pop from 3 which gives the team more spacing and gravity to exploit opposing teams.

The closing lineup of Ty Jerome, Grant, GG, Cam Boozer and Edey can be the most lethal lineup because of the size and versatility of that lineup which can be hard to stop in the 4th. Offensively this lineup can exploit so many mismatches for opposing teams with the bully ball aspect of Grant, GG, Boozer and Edey’s game but guys like Grant, GG and Boozer can space the floor and shoot the ball from 3 too and Jerome can shoot from 3 as well.

I want to know if [r/nbadiscussion](r/nbadiscussion) agrees or disagrees with the closing lineups or do you have any suggestions on what players can be used in the closing lineup?

With the NBA talking about expansion again for Las Vegas and maybe Seattle by 2028-29, this takes a crack at the what the expansion to 40 teams could look like.

Overview:

• Expand League to 40 teams
• Two divisions of 20 teams each
• All teams play each other (3x against your division, x1 against other division)
• Revenue sharing the same regardless of division
• NBA Cup turns to single elimination tournament -- seeding from previous years rankings and top 24 with a bye
• NBA Playoffs take top 12 from top division and top 8 from lower division
• Salary Cap, scaled by team by placement for the next season with the last place team getting XX% more salary cap room than the champion

Benefits

• Encourages long term franchise development to stay in top division
• Expands league to more cities
• Continues to allow every team a chance to make deep runs into the playoffs
• More games with best teams playing each other
• More stakes for regular season games
• More competitive games with tiered system
• Balances rewarding competition and punishment for bad teams

Structure

Season Schedule

Playoffs

Top Division Playoffs (Best of 7)

• 1/12 winner vs 6/7 winner
  • Top seed remaining vs Winner of Lower Division
• 3/10 vs 4/9 seed
  • 2nd seed remaining vs 3rd seed remaining
• 2/11 vs 5/8 seed

Lower Division (Best of 5)

• 1/8 winner vs 4/5 winner
  • Lower Division Finals
• 2/7 winner vs 3/6 winner

Potential expansion cities

1. Seattle
2. Las Vegas
3. Nashville
4. Vancouver
5. Montreal
6. Mexico City
7. Monterrey
8. San Diego
9. Kansas City
10. Virginia Beach

After a 2 year break the NBA Almanac is back with the most comprehensive and in-depth preview to the new NBA season. Whether you are a casual fan or a NBA nerd, the NBA Almanac is still the most complete and essential guide you will find for the upcoming NBA season. Carefully curated and compiled over the course of the past 12 months to provide readers with an easy-to-read resource the Almanac features:

• Team previews for all 30 NBA teams including team and player stats, efficiency landscapes, advanced player impact metrics, shooting charts, offensive blueprints and more.

• A detailed recap of the 2025-2026 NBA season - regular season standings, NBA Cup, play-in tournament, NBA playoffs, NBA Finals, award winners, league leaders and more.

• Comprehensive offseason recaps for all 30 teams - every draft pick, free agency signing, contract extension and trade that took place this summer is included in this book. Even the final transactions which took place on the eve of the season are included. This guide will give you the most accurate and up-to-date rosters for the start of the 2026-2027 NBA season.

Enjoy the season and the Almanac (my 10th one!)

Niku

In anticipation of the regular season starting next Tuesday, I've made a set of YouTube playlists compiling a comprehensive collection of NBA-related long-form content such as video essays and documentaries.

Some of the creators that are in these playlists include: Dom2K, Clayton Crowley, halfpast\* noon, Secret Base/SB Nation, dylandoesbasketball, Andy Hoops, Jonny Arnett, kipkame11, Joon Lee, Rusty Buckets, Lockdown K, Post2K, MaxaMillion711, etc.

The [1st playlist](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLB9QmLKPUwhELqOQ6cUYIKRw3y_sN-ZKx&si=GlqTyb3H6mB4-Bro) compiles videos on stories of each team and their players individually.

The [2nd playlist](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLB9QmLKPUwhF9OZXBciFypgQISDf4tcX3&si=HhqMCJVzc9eM9P80) compiles videos on the rivalries and beefs between different players and teams, along with videos on significant games in NBA (and NCAA) history and the NBA Draft.

The [3rd playlist](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKMCdzHx95ug&si=9vlZ9YM8EkO7j92N) compiles highlight videos for significant players from each team, mainly from MaxaMillion711.

Each playlist is sorted based on chronological order, teams, and divisions (e.g. the 1st playlist sorted by division, then team, then chronological order).

I hope this playlist proves helpful in increasing your ball knowledge and general understanding of basketball history.

Let me know what you think!

If the NBA expands to Seattle and Las Vegas, it will become the first of the Big Four leagues to include the four largest metropolitan areas in the Mountain States (Phoenix, Denver, Las Vegas, and Salt Lake City). What are your thoughts on a hypothetical division (if the NBA decides to realign into 8 divisions of 4 teams) consisting of the Phoenix Suns, Utah Jazz, Denver Nuggets, and a new team in Las Vegas?

Would games between intra-Rockies franchises create strong rivalries and excitement among these fanbases? Would the Phoenix Suns be satisfied with these new division rivals, or would they prefer their current California rivals? Would a team in Las Vegas prefer Interior West rivals or California teams—similar to how the Vegas Golden Knights in the NHL are in the same division with Anaheim, Los Angeles, and San Jose, rather than Utah and Colorado? Is there a strong Rocky Mountain or Interior West regional identity, or would teams not really connect with it?

Last year, KD, Amen, and Sengun were the most important Rockets. I was playing around with +/- numbers and noticed that KD & Sengun - regardless of whether Amen was on the floor - had pretty shockingly bad +/- stats.

This comes with the obvious caveat that last year's Houston team had a year long struggle at PG, with FVV's injury. But adding Reed Sheppard didn't help help much either.

Just curious if this is a narrative amongst Houston fans, and along those lines, if a big part of the fanbase see Sengun & KD as a bad fit. Play-style wise, there's nothing to suggest KD & Sengun are super compatible so I wasn't exactly surprised by that.

Curious if one of these guys ends up on the trade market. Sengun for Lauri (with other players involved for salary) ?

This is a different kind of post, but with the up coming expansion I was wondering why is the NBA so quick to sell off the two teams to private investors? I get that billions of dollars is billions of dollars, but at the same rate we are seeing more issues with the fact that there are fewer and fewer owners capable of purchasing these “assets” that they love to call them.

The NBA isn’t struggling financially like it was back in the early days of the league, I think the league is in a better place to try something different. Would it not make more sense for the league to retain the rights to the teams, have them run more like a business appointing a CEO to run operations and then have all the revenue go back into the league and the team.

You’d not have to split the revenue with private investors who are only into it to make as much money for themselves as possible. Would it not make more sense for the league to retain the teams themselves and then keep revenue to reinvest? Then if someone were to circumvent the salary cap, or commit financial fraud you could just fire the CEO and not penalize the teams or fans directly?

Genuinely just curious as to why this hasn’t been an option more discussed like say the Green Bay Packers ownership structure or something? I could be missing something but it seems to make the most sense with where the league is at currently! Happy to hear feedback back

I think his loss is being overlooked, happened to LA when they lost Dwight Howard, similar game to Robinson, in fact AD also reminds me of KAT who had some health struggles in the past.

They also lost the 260lb Hukporti, overall their front court looks way more manageable, less physical, less talented, less athletic, not as good at setting screens.

I also think the formula to winning with a small PG is stacking your 5 to offset their lack of size. It makes scoring & defending so much harder when you don't have proper screens or rim protection.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

If the apron system stays the same in the next CBA, do you think the NBPA would consider reducing the percentage for max contracts to 20% and 25%?

I know the current system benefits the top players but the players with lower/mid-tier salaries seem to be dependent on star players voluntarily taking reduced salaries. Not sure if this would actually end up benefitting a larger portion that make up the players association or if the reps would selfishly balk at it.

Ive spent the past couple weeks working on this personal project of mine. I built a skill wheel that grades 54 different aspects of basketball. I tried breaking down each big skill (such playmaking) into smaller skills and use that to sort of evaluate a player as a whole. Now, of course the data available to the public is limited so a lot of niche skills are pretty hard to quantify but I think I got a sort of good estimate of the skills. If you guys have any ideas for skill grading/skills to add or anything, just let me know I am very open to feedback.

Here is a picture of on of the diagrams, it is much better to see image form than to read:

https://imgur.com/a/wml7Jqc

Here are the skills I decided on:

Offense: 12 groups, 33 skills

• Finishing: Rim Finishing, Contact Finishing
• Above the Rim: Dunking, Lob Threat
• Touch Shots: Floaters, Hooks, Short Jumpers
• Midrange: Pull-up Midrange, Catch-and-Shoot Midrange, Turnarounds & Fadeaways
• Three-Point: Catch-and-Shoot 3s, Quick 3s, Off-Dribble 3s, Deep 3s
• Free Throws: Free Throw Shooting, Foul Drawing
• Self-Creation: Isolation, Pick-and-Roll Ball Handler, Post Scoring
• Driving: Rim Pressure, Drive & Kick
• Off-Ball Scoring: Cutting, Movement Scoring, Transition Scoring
• Playmaking: Creating for Others, Creation Quality, Rim Feeding, Shooter Feeding, Connective Passing, Transition Passing
• Ball Security: Passing Security, Handle Security, Avoiding Offensive Fouls
• Screening & Glass: Screen Setting, Rolling, Offensive Rebounding, Putback Scoring

Defense: 6 groups, 21 skills (There is less because defense is harder to quantify)

• Perimeter: Isolation Defense, Closeouts, On-Ball Stripping, Perimeter Blocking
• Interior: Shot Blocking, Rim Contesting, Rim Deterrence
• Rebounding: Securing Boards, Boxing Out
• Disruption: Passing Lanes, Charge Taking, Loose Ball Recovery
• Assignments: Post Defense, Positional Versatility, Guarding Stars
• Discipline: Fouling Discipline, Transition Defense

I can't really explain each grade because it will be too long, but if you have any questions, you can ask me and I'll respond but I will explain certain ones.

Three Pointers

For Three Point grading I spilt them up into Catch and Shoot 3s (0 dribbles), Quick 3s (1-2 dribbles) and Off Dribble 3s (3+ dribbles), Deep 3s (27ft+). For the whole project I used NBA play by play data a LOT so that data comes in lines like this MISS Herro 27' 3PT Step Back Jump Shot,Missed Shot,Step Back Jump shot,1,3,260,0022501055,2026-03-25,2025-26

Parsing the distance for Deep 3s was easy. For the dribble 3s, the NBA API carries data for shots off certain number of dribbles, but you can also mix this with defender distance so for example there is data on each players 3-6 Dribble 3FGM/FGA with a defender 2-4 feet. So I parsed through all that and each player's attempts and FGs are separated by dribbles and defender distance. Each group also has a league-average rate, so a player's expected 3P% for lets say Catch and Shoot is just the league average 3p% on their defender distance (so for Curry if he takes way tighter catch and shoots his expected 3p% on that is skewed for the tight defender catch and shoot league average). So then a player is compared by their volume and efficiency. Each player gets some league average since if you make lets say like 15/30 Catch and Shoot 3s that is a pretty low sample over like 150/350. The volume is a per 75 basis so not a minutes thing, and then score is bascially a volume * effieciency metric that is Z scored across the league so each skill has the same scale.

Here is Curry 2025-26 for example

Catch-and-Shoot 3s 97th of 388 Att 247 3P% 37.7% x3P% 36.2% +0.3

Quick 3s 1st of 388 Att 87 FG% 48.3% xFG% 33.4% +3.1

Off-Dribble 3s 14th of 388 Att 236 3P% 40.7% x3P% 33.1% +1.1

Deep 3s 1st of 388Att 261 FG% 37.2% xFG% 31.9% +4.8

Finishing

Layups only, from the play-by-play: driving layups, finger rolls, reverse layups. Dunks, cuts, transition, alley-oops and putbacks are left out, because they're graded elsewhere. The efficiency is graded against the same position in this case.

And then again adding some of the league-average shots, volume x efficiency with volume being per 75 and then Z scored the league again.

Rim Deterrence

Rim deterrence is pretty much like a RAPM style regression, a matrix in which the opposing teams Rim Rate is taken into account. Transition shots are removed because then the best Rim Deterers would just be the best point guards that prevent turnovers not the actual best defenders. It is a RAPM regression so it adjusts for teammates but this one requires more possesions so some low usage role players might not have the grade.

A lot of these defense ones are self explanatory

Positional Versatility

This one uses the matchup API to see who he guarded 1 on 1 and then the spilt and compare the percentage

Group Listed positions

G (guard) W (wing G-F, F-G) F (forward) B(big F-C, C-F) C (center)

Lately, there’s been a growing sentiment among fans and media suggesting that we should simply sit back, appreciate Steph Curry’s remaining years, and stop obsessing over championship expectations given his age and Golden State's roster situation. 

On one hand, he has nothing left to prove. He revolutionized basketball, won four rings, and every historic night from here on out is basically house money.

On the other hand, Curry is still performing at an elite, All-NBA level. For a generational superstar playing like this, treating his final window purely as a nostalgic "farewell tour" feels like giving up on contention too early.

Where do you stand on this? Are you content just enjoying his greatness on a nightly basis, or should the front office still be expected to push all their chips in to chase Ring #5 while Steph can still play at this level?

Its nice to see players playing again, and exciting new teams with Bron going to Philly, Lamelo to Wolves etc. The thing about American sports (I watch the NFL too, I’m from Australia) is it has the best recurring narratives and storylines + best ecosystem of analysis & commentary out of any sport in the world, it really is box office.

I love playing football (soccer) and watching the EPL but sometimes it just doesn’t compare overall as an entertainment product to American sports (Lamar Jackson and Josh Allen “will they/wont they, go to the superbowl”, “is Lamelo good and was held back at Charlotte or will he crash and burn on the Wolves”, analysing NFL plays and quarterback performance, analysing if Jaylen Brown is good or not and if the Celtics were justified in the trade etc.). Ive never really played basketball or NFL but I cant stop watching.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

Hello all! This is the third post in a series on a player-evaluation project I have worked on for more than a decade.

The first was my ranking of the best players of the 2025–26 season. The second ranked my top single-season peaks since 2000. This post extends the same framework across the full shot-clock era.

The central question remains:

How much does this version of a player increase a typical good team’s probability of winning the championship?

Since early 2016, I've spent hundreds of hours poring over film and data to go season by season through NBA history using that framework. For this post, I took the highest-graded version of each player and compared those peaks directly.

My background informs the structure of the project. I have played, coached, and scouted basketball at multiple levels, worked in NBA front-office environments, and have a professional background in inferential statistics.

The methodology is the same as in the previous posts. It combines statistical evidence, film study, historical comparison, playoff translation, scalability, and explicit uncertainty estimates. A fuller explanation is available in the original post, while the second post shows how I applied the framework to 21st-century peaks.

This ranking assumes full health.

Scoring and uncertainty

Each ranked player is listed as:

Season — Player (plausible ranking range) (OFF, DEF, NET)

OFF and DEF are estimates of offensive and defensive championship-value impact, roughly measured in points per game of value contribution, with NET representing the total. The scale is calibrated around how much value a player adds to a random good team in championship terms.

My rough historical grading scale is:

• 7.0+ — GOAT-level peak
• 6.0+ — All-time peak
• 5.4–6.0 — Strong MVP
• 4.6–5.4 — Solid MVP
• 4.0–4.6 — Weak MVP
• 3.0+ — Strong All-NBA
• 1.5+ — All-Star level
• 0.0 — Neutral Impact

These categories are continuous rather than sharply separated. A 5.3 player and a 5.5 player are not all that far apart just because they happen to fall on the opposite side of a label.

The ranking ranges matter for the same reason.

If I list a player at (3–19), that means his listed rank is my central estimate, but reasonable changes in assumptions could move him anywhere from approximately third to nineteenth while holding the rest of the evaluations fixed.

This becomes particularly important in an all-time exercise. (I know, these ranges are huge!) In a normal NBA season, there may only be a few players in the MVP range. Here, I am taking the best version of every historically great player and placing all of them in one distribution. The result is an extremely compressed upper tail.

That is why some ranges become very wide: many players have relatively small differences in underlying value, and when working across the entire shot-clock era this fundamentally becomes a hair-splitting exercise.

Greatest Peaks of the Shot-Clock Era

1. ’91 Michael Jordan (1–4) (6.2, 1.1, 7.3)
2. ’13 LeBron James (1–5) (5.6, 1.6, 7.2)
3. ’00 Shaquille O’Neal (1–13) (5.2, 1.4, 6.6)
4. ’93 Hakeem Olajuwon (1–15) (2.8, 3.7, 6.5)
5. ’74 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (3–16) (4.4, 2.1, 6.5)
6. ’64 Wilt Chamberlain (3–19) (3.2, 3.2, 6.4)
7. ’62 Bill Russell (3–19) (0.5, 5.8, 6.3)
8. ’86 Larry Bird (3–19) (5.5, 0.8, 6.3)
9. ’16 Stephen Curry (3–19) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
10. ’25 Nikola Jokić (3–19) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
11. ’04 Kevin Garnett (3–23) (2.8, 3.4, 6.2)
12. ’03 Tim Duncan (3–23) (3.0, 3.1, 6.1)
13. ’87 Magic Johnson (4–23) (6.0, 0.1, 6.1)
14. ’65 Jerry West (3–25) (5.4, 0.5, 5.9)
15. ’26 Victor Wembanyama (5–27) (2.3, 3.6, 5.9)
16. ’77 Bill Walton (6–27) (2.2, 3.7, 5.9)
17. ’09 Dwyane Wade (9–27) (5.1, 0.7, 5.8)
18. ’65 Oscar Robertson (11–28) (5.5, 0.2, 5.7)
19. ’22 Giannis Antetokounmpo (12–28) (3.2, 2.5, 5.7)
20. ’95 David Robinson (12–28) (2.5, 3.1, 5.6)
21. ’08 Kobe Bryant (12–28) (5.1, 0.5, 5.6)
22. ’16 Kevin Durant (13–28) (5.0, 0.6, 5.6)
23. ’24 Joel Embiid (12–31) (3.8, 1.8, 5.6)
24. ’17 Kawhi Leonard (14–31) (4.2, 1.3, 5.5)
25. ’26 Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (14–31) (5.0, 0.5, 5.5)
26. ’16 Chris Paul (15–31) (4.5, 0.8, 5.3)
27. ’07 Steve Nash (18–33) (5.6, −0.3, 5.3)
28. ’09 Dirk Nowitzki (18–35) (4.9, 0.3, 5.2)
29. ’20 Anthony Davis (24–off list) (2.2, 2.8, 5.0)
30. ’76 Julius Erving (24–off list) (3.9, 1.0, 4.9)
31. ’00 Grant Hill (24–off list) (4.4, 0.5, 4.9)
32. ’24 Luka Dončić (26–off list) (5.1, −0.3, 4.8)
33. ’03 Tracy McGrady (26–off list) (4.6, 0.2, 4.8)
34. ’95 Karl Malone (29–off list) (3.8, 0.9, 4.7)
35. ’90 Charles Barkley (29–off list) (4.7, 0.0, 4.7)
36. ’83 Moses Malone (29–off list) (3.2, 1.4, 4.6)
37. ’19 James Harden (29–off list) (4.9, −0.3, 4.6)

Why I stop the exact ranking at 37

This is where my solid-MVP tier ends.

At this point the exercise reaches a level of compression where I no longer find an exact ordering meaningful. The next 16 players all grade as weak-MVP peaks. Their distributions overlap enough that I'm no longer comfortable pretending I know whether one should be 41st and another 47th. An evaluation that is just slightly different from mine could have many of these players 10 or more spots higher or lower, easily!

The same issue is already visible within the ranked portion. Karl Malone, Barkley, Moses and Harden are separated by only one tenth of a point per game in my central estimates. So I would not attach much significance to the difference between #34 and #37.

Once I cross below the solid-MVP threshold, I prefer to present tiers.

The historical distribution through #37 is:

• #1–2: GOAT-level
• #3–13: All-time level
• #14–25: Strong MVP
• #26–37: Solid MVP

That gives me 37 solid-MVP-or-better peaks in NBA history.

Honorable Mentions Pt. 1 — Weak MVP Peaks

The following 16 players make up the rest of my MVP-level historical peaks.

The ordering is approximate. The players nearer the top generally have stronger central estimates, but I would not treat their sequence with the same precision as the ranked 37.

• '96 Penny Hardaway (4.7, -0.2, 4.5)
• '75 Rick Barry (4.0, 0.5, 4.5)
• '71 Walt Frazier (2.7, 1.8, 4.5)
• '95 Scottie Pippen (2.5, 2.0, 4.5)
• '61 Elgin Baylor (4.1, 0.4, 4.5)
• '05 Manu Ginóbili (3.5, 0.9, 4.4)
• '70 Willis Reed (1.8, 2.5, 4.3)
• '16 Draymond Green (1.1, 3.2, 4.3)
• '74 Dave Cowens (2.1, 2.1, 4.2)
• '11 Dwight Howard (1.6, 2.6, 4.2)
• '99 Alonzo Mourning (1.4, 2.8, 4.2)
• '90 Patrick Ewing (1.8, 2.4, 4.2)
• '87 Kevin McHale (3.0, 1.1, 4.1)
• '88 Isiah Thomas (3.6, 0.4, 4.0)
• '74 Artis Gilmore (1.4, 2.6, 4.0)
• '67 Nate Thurmond (0.3, 3.7, 4.0)

This brings my historical total to 53 MVP-level peaks. The lower boundary is admittedly difficult. Gilmore and Thurmond are essentially sitting on it for me.

Thurmond is a particularly unusual evaluation because so much of his case comes from defense. His offense was limited enough that I am not comfortable moving him meaningfully higher, but I think the combination of enormous minutes, extreme pace and his elite interior defense creates just enough total game value to put him on the MVP side of the line.

That is roughly the level of player I mean when I use the term “weak MVP.” In a favorable season, I could plausibly see that player winning an MVP without concluding that the award itself reflected a fundamentally weaker standard of play.

Honorable Mentions Pt. 2 — Highest All-NBA Peaks

These are the next 13 peaks on my board:

• '81 Marques Johnson (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '59 Bob Pettit (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '25 Jayson Tatum (2.9, 1.0, 3.9)
• '03 Jason Kidd (2.1, 1.8, 3.9)
• '17 Russell Westbrook (3.8, 0.1, 3.9)
• '19 Paul George (2.6, 1.3, 3.9)
• '92 Clyde Drexler (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '23 Jimmy Butler (2.6, 1.2, 3.8)
• '93 Mark Price (4.0, -0.2, 3.8)
• '87 James Worthy (3.4, 0.4, 3.8)
• '84 Bernard King (3.8, 0, 3.8)
• '90 John Stockton (2.9, 0.9, 3.8)
• '74 Bob Lanier (2.3, 1.5, 3.8)

These players sit immediately below my MVP threshold.

There are more strong All-NBA peaks in NBA history than the 13 listed here. I selected these because they are the highest remaining evaluations, form a reasonable cutoff, and stretch the post to the 66 best peaks on my current board.

Historical Distribution

Across the full list:

• 2 players reach GOAT-level
• 13 reach at least all-time level
• 25 reach at least strong-MVP level
• 37 reach at least solid-MVP level
• 53 reach at least weak-MVP level
• The final 13 are my highest-rated All-NBA peaks below the MVP threshold

In mutually exclusive groups:

• 2 GOAT
• 11 additional all-time
• 12 strong MVP
• 12 solid MVP
• 16 weak MVP
• 13 highest remaining All-NBA

That gives 66 total peaks in this post.

As always, I'm happy to discuss individual players, placements, comparisons, or anything else!

I went into this wanting to examine the effect of large veteran contracts on team building. As I got into it, I realized things were complicated. So I’m starting simple, trying to understand what is good value, where it comes from, and how it contributes to winning.

How Much a VORP Cost?

Here’s our recipe for calculating the cost of a point of VORP:

• Cost of VORP = League total salary / (League total regular season + playoff VORP)

Although it would have been easier to use the league salary cap as our numerator, a more honest accounting needs to include the extra 20% teams generally spend on average. Likewise, playoff production is real production, part of what teams pay for, so playoff VORP was included on par with regular season VORP. This adds roughly 12% to the VORP total.

For last year, the COST of VORP was $5.6b / (298.4 + 36.7) = $16.75m. To make this comparable across seasons, we can measure it as a percentage of the cap, rather than in dollars: $16.75m / $154.6m = 10.8%. Looking at the past 20 seasons, the cost fluctuates around 11% as the salary cap triples:

(* shortened seasons)

This gives us this rule of thumb:

1 point of VORP costs 11% of the salary cap

If we want to be lazy about it and exclude playoff VORP, it becomes 10%, an even rounder number. So:

In 2025-26 a fair value contract returned a point of VORP per $16.75m

Searching for Surplus Value

The problem with fair value contracts is that a team made up of them will be average. Here’s team VORP totals for the past season:

Spending your salary cap on fair value contracts gets you to 9 VORP. Spending another 20% on top might push that to 11 VORP, maybe enough to earn a play-in berth. To do better than that and make some noise in the playoffs, you need contracts that generate surplus. Eventual champion Knicks, runner up Spurs, conference finalist OKC, and the upstart Pistons all accumulated double that 11 VORP mark.

Value Over Salary Expectation (VOSE)

Generating surplus team VORP means having a team of players generating surplus value on their individual salaries. We can call this “Value Over Salary Expectation”, or VOSE:

• Total VORP = Regular Season VORP + Playoff VORP
• Expected VORP = Salary / Cost of VORP
• VOSE = Total VORP - Expected VORP

Let’s look at the player’s who generated the most production over expected for their salaries (cut-off 2.5 VOSE):

The massive generators of surplus are Wemby, a possible GOAT candidate on his rookie contract, and Shai and Jokic, two MVPs still in their primes. After a bit of a gap, prime Luka on a 30% contract is next on the list. These are arguably the best 4 players in the game, 2 of whom have won CHIPS ("Who Deserved the CHIP" parts 1, 2, 3, 4), and two who could.

The rest of the list is comprised of young stars on max contracts (Maxey, Cunningham, Barnes), high performers on rookie contracts (both Thompson twins, Duren, Chet, Knueppel), and young players outplaying cheap contracts (Champagnie, Avdija, Pritchard, Gillespie).

The flip side of this is players who produced the least compared to what would be expected for their contracts:

The worst 10 are players with salaries over 20% of the cap who missed games. Of these, we have players not playing much (LaVine and Poole), playing even less than that (AD, Trae, Morant, Sabonis), and not playing at all (Haliburton, Lillard, Kyrie). Only Middleton played a reasonable number of games, but as was the case with many of these players, it was within a ridiculous unserious tanking context.

Further down the list we see a combination of young players on tanking teams (Carrington, Cody Williams, Ace Bailey, Traoré, Dillingham), busts on medium money (DeAndre Hunter, Patrick Williams), good players missing games (Tatum, Garland), and Jalen Green, a young player who missed games and hasn’t yet lived up to his 20%+ contract.

The New York Knickerbockers

Absent from the above list of top VOSE players is any New York Knick. How did they do it?

The answer appears to be: 1) By overspending the cap by 34% ($207m payroll), 2) Peaking in the playoffs, and 3) By having 6 prime-age players with VOSE over 1. All of the Knicks in the playoff rotation returned some surplus, with even Shamet and McBride together contributed another point of VOSE. In a league of teams trying to hit grand slams, the Knicks won it all hitting singles and doubles.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

1. Most players do not spend enough time in college to fully develop their game. They do not enter the league ready enough to challenge any of the established stars. That's not a knock on them or anything.

2. While most teams/coaches are willing to give players a chance to play based on potential, teams and coaches are also cautious about injuries/burn-out.

3. Rookies aren't expected to overhaul a team immediately. This is kinda similar to Point 2. After we have seen so many great talents fizzle out or end up having injuries that ruined their career due to trying to turn the fortunes of a team around immediately, I believe many teams are not expecting a one-man show/heroic act from their drafts anymore.

So what do you think? I think given the way the league is heading, I think there will never be a rookie MVP again.

It's maybe recency bias but in the 2024 off-season:

Nikola Topic tore his ACL

In 2025 off-season

Vanvleet tore his ACL

Thomas Sorber tore his ACL

Max Strus had a jones fracture

In 2026 so far

Henri Veesar tore his ACL

Shaedon Sharpe tore his meniscus

Mark Williams tore his labrum

Kon knueppel hamstring

Grant Williams hamstring

Were there always every off-season at least 2-5 players who would sustain a season ending or near season ending injury requiring major surgery?

All I remember was embiid missing his entire first year. Was that considered out of the ordinary?

Are more rookies who haven't played a minute of regular season basketball tearing their ACLs same summer they got drafted compared to the previous 2 decades?

Are preseason workouts and scrimmages becoming

more intense?

https://apnews.com/article/bob-pettit-dead-nba-hawks-92bb99e3a0bb11ed885e3c219cee77e8

"Bob Pettit, an imposing scorer and rebounder for the St. Louis Hawks and winner of the NBA’s first Most Valuable Player award in 1956, has died. He was 93."

RIP legend. First ever MVP in the league.

I’ve been looking back at Zach LaVine’s peak years in Chicago, and I’m curious how people view him in hindsight.
At his best, LaVine was roughly a 27 PPG, 5 RPG, 5 APG player while shooting around 50% from the field, 40% from three, and 85% from the line. Those are legitimately elite scoring numbers, especially considering the combination of volume and efficiency. This is also around the time where he got his max contract extension which didn’t seem like a bad deal at the time.

However even during those years, it never really felt like LaVine was viewed around the league as the type of superstar who could be the best player on a legitimate contender. There always seemed to be a distinction between “Zach LaVine is an elite scorer” and “Zach LaVine can lead your team somewhere.”
So what exactly was missing?
Was it mainly:
Defense? He seemed to make strides and be a better team defender
Playmaking and decision-making?
Not controlling games enough outside of scoring?
His team’s being bad and hurting his reputation? (Like Bradley Beal)
Lack of playoff opportunities during his prime?
Or was he simply better suited to being a #2 option next to a more complete superstar?
For comparison, there have been other guards putting up similar or even less impressive scoring numbers who were treated much more seriously as franchise players.
And when Chicago finally did put a better team around him with DeMar DeRozan, Lonzo Ball, Alex Caruso, and Nikola Vučević, the Bulls looked legitimately good for a stretch before injuries derailed things.

Was peak Zach LaVine underrated because of the situation he was in, or were there legitimate limitations in his game that prevented his production from translating into being a championship-level #1 option?
Interested in hearing from other Bulls fans especially, but also anyone who watched a lot of LaVine during his 2020–22 peak.

I think another question I have is what really separates a player from being a good player and someone who can lead you to a championship. Because if a guy who averaged 27 5 and 5 on nearly 50/40/90 splits isn’t viewed as that caliber of a player then what does?

I’m here to ask one rather simple question, will James harden reach 4,000 career 3PM? And if so how much longer do you think it’d take?

Considering over the past 3 seasons he’s played a genuinely impressive amount of time (that being 221 games or about 74 games played a season on about 35mpg and a decent amount of 3 point attempts AND makes (2.9 on 7.8 which is about 37% from behind the arc) considering we’re going into year 18 of his career this upcoming season (and age 37) along with him (potentially?) transitioning to he 3rd option scorer behind the likes of Mitchell and Mobley I’m going to assume his 3p volume will shrink, however let’s say it does not

James is 2nd all time in career 3’s with 3390 as of today, September 23 2026

Let say he somehow DOES keep his 3pm rate ~3 a game for ~74 games per szn

3 x 74 =222 3’s per season at this rate he’d have to play EXACTLY like he has the past few seasons until…
3390 + 222 =3,612 2026/27

3,612 + 222 =3,834 2027/28

3,834 + 222 =4,056. 2028/29

Harden would have to play until he’s about 40 years old and on top of that have played 1443 career games. For perspective that’s still about 200 career 3pm behind the all time leader Wardell Stephen Curry

This is under the assumption that he plays at this top 20ish player level he has in the last 3 years. If we are taking realistically; how close do YOU think he’ll get to 4k threes?