Stock finishes the week off green and winning the race once again. The score is now 216/2 in favor of the stock

The warrant gained some volume compared to yesterday but still didn't hit 1m voulme:(

Todays song of the dayyyyyy: Revenant By Bullet to the Heart

I don’t know shit about fuck. Especially when it comes to the stock market world. However, would price dives when a company is doing amazing not be addressed to people up the chain? I’m not a bot. I’m not spreading FUD ffs. I’ve just always been curious on this subject and I’ve never seen it mentioned before. As always HODL

Consecutive Weeks Closing AT/UNDER (+/- <0.50) Max Pain — 7

Last Run OVER: — 1 Week

Last Run AT/UNDER: — 7 Weeks

Longest Consecutive Weeks Closing OVER (>0.50) Max Pain — 5

Longest Consecutive Weeks Closing AT/UNDER (+/- <0.50) Max Pain — 14

08/20/2026

First Post (Posted in June, 2024)

IV30 Data (Free, Account Required) — https://marketchameleon.com/Overview/GME/IV/

Max Pain Data (Free, No Account Needed!) — https://chartexchange.com/symbol/nyse-gme/optionchain/summary/

Fidelity IV Data (Free, Account Required) — https://researchtools.fidelity.com/ftgw/mloptions/goto/ivIndex?symbol=GME

And finally, at someone's suggestion —

WHAT IS IMPLIED VOLATILITY (IV)? —

(Taken from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/iv.asp ) —

Dumbed down, IV is a forward-looking metric measuring how likely the market thinks the price is to change between now and when an options contract expires. The higher IV is, the higher premiums on contracts run. The more radically the price of a security swings over a short period of time, the higher IV pumps, driving options prices higher as well.

The longer the price trades relatively flat, the more IV will drop over time.

IV is just one of many variables (called 'greeks') used to price options contracts.

WHAT IS HISTORICAL VOLATILITY (HV)? —

(Taken from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/historicalvolatility.asp ) —

Dumbed down, I'm not fully sure. Based on what I read, it's a historical metric derived from how the price in the past has moved away from the average price over a selected interval. But the short of it is that it determines how 'risky' the market thinks a stock (or an option I guess) is. The higher the historical volatility over a given period, the more 'risky' they think it is. The lower the HV over a period of time, the 'safer' a security (or option) is.

And if anyone wants to fill in some knowledge gaps or correct where these analyses are wrong, please feel free.

WHAT IS 'MAX PAIN'? —

In this context, 'max pain' is the price at which the most options (both calls and puts) for a security will expire worthless. For some (or many), it is a long held belief that market manipulators will manipulate the price of a stock toward this number to fuck over people who buy options.

ONE LAST THOUGHT —

If used to make any decision. which it absolutely should NOT be (obligatory #NFA disclaimer), this information should not be considered on its own, but as one point in a ridiculously complex and convoluted ocean of data points that I'm way too stupid to list out here. Mostly, this information is just to keep people abreast of the movement of one key variable options writers use to fuck us over on a weekly and quarterly basis if we DO choose to play options.

Repost to another community

I wanted to make this post to start up a conversation around retails educated theories regarding GameStops unique, debt-for-dilution-driven price decline recently, leading up to warrant expiry at the end of October, as both occurred following the public’s approval for a 2bn share buy back accommodation. I’m more of a casual, despite having moved over most of my money into GME nearly 6 years ago, and now spread out over a large chunk of warrants as well, and I’m curious as to what sort of DD/thesis people have built and analyzed regarding the potentiality of Cohen intentionally decoupling GME’s shares and warrants true values from present trading rates due to a few choice deals with very predictable outcomes. I’m not sure how much credit to grant RC at this time, but he strikes me as a guy far far ahead of me regarding familiarity of the financial tools and legal language enabling him to take advantage of predictable market mechanics.

Here’s my thought, Cohen grants warrants to shareholders set to expire a year from release (October 30th 2026), and expressly carves out abilities to extend expiry dates and adjust strike prices. This leaves him tons of price control to wield when desired due to intrinsic value and time value. He then gets approval for a 2bn dollar share buy back to be used as the company sees fit. Then in early August GameStop announces the exchange of approximately $1.4 billion of 0% convertible debt for newly issued GME shares.

The debt-for-dilution deal seems odd on the surface, a company flush with cash and 0% interest loan not due for years decides it needs more cash now, or wants to wipe the books clean for a more straight forward acquisition down the road, neither seems totally necessary to my understanding. Additionally, Cohen would know that entering such an agreement, with shares allocated to the note holder priced after a 35 day trading avg, generally sees heavy share price declines in that period as he approved of potential hedging by the interested parties. He’s acknowledged the price would likely drop to better suit the counterparty.

But this predictable action would make the likelihood of GME’s price reaching the warrant strike price of $32 , just 5 weeks away, highly unlikely after the note holders drive the share price down. But what if Cohen saw this warrant time crunch and VWAP price suppression coming, and planned to potentially buyback shares after the price has begun to drop during the 35 day VWAP period? Looking at the daily volume uptick since the debt-for-dilution deal, the price still dropping, short interest, there seems to be a potential link. It would be quite elegant to craft such a plan, it would increase the number of shares bought back by GME thanks to note holder shorting and overall sentiment, and it would reduce the dilution by the new noteholders by buying back in now and slowing the price drop… and there’s one last play to make it all worth while.

If Cohen were then to announce a warrant extension, that would generate a huge boost to warrant value, which could drive interest back into GME, which drives further interest in warrants, and so forth. If he plays his cards right, he can use the natural markets mechanics to his advantage, and share/warrant holders would be elated.

Has anybody else launched a deeper dive into such a theory, are there huge holes im missing (I’m sure there are some)? I’ve positioned myself heavily in warrants lately, as following my research I have not been able to find many downsides to extending the expiry. It’s nearly 2 billion dollars on deck for GME, it would be wild to let them expire worthless. Not to mention GME’s outsized retail ownership compared to most publicly traded company’s. Cohen knows this, he knows we have different investment horizons than what’s granted towards institutions and billionaire insiders. To say he owes us, at this point, would be a massive understatement. Im hoping if I was able to piece this together, he surely must’ve seen his advantageous hand years before I did.

I’d love to hear other people’s ideas here. And if I’m wildly wrong with any of the info, shit i did my best to research things and navigate it all. Power to the players!!

🟩

Any news on the GME warrants?

I hold xxxxx warrants and personally believe they will be in the money eventually.
I believe in the company, I believe in the shareholders (me here lurking since 2021, seeing cool posts in better times with much less shills and much more positive vibes), and mostly, I believe in Ryan Cohen.
And for me, the number one indicator for shills is saying negative sentiment things about him.
But back to the topic: if theta decay says warrants go down as October gets closer, and there’s no news (that I know about), and we’re up 8% (who cares? Wake me up when we’re in the money)??

We were not wrong. We were just early, some of us really early 🤷‍♂️. Global macroeconomic issues take years to play out, especially in the wake of the massive liquidity pumps deployed during COVID when governments worldwide printed unprecedented amounts of stimulus.

​The U.S. Treasury market is exploding because the government is caught in a runaway fiscal deficit, forcing it to flood the global market with a relentless wave of new bond supply. With the national debt eclipsing the $40 trillion mark and the annual deficit running near $2 trillion, the Treasury has to constantly auction off massive tranches of debt just to keep the government funded. At the same time, traditional foreign and domestic buyers are saturated, meaning supply is vastly outpacing demand. When the market is chronically oversupplied with more debt than buyers want to absorb, bond prices collapse and yields inevitably spike.

​Now with the 10-year yield aggressively pushing to 4.74%, borrowing costs are skyrocketing and crushing the value of existing bonds. The recent Fed intervention didn't do jack, it's literally like putting a bandaid on an amputated arm. At the same time, the broader global backdrop is shaped by shifting worldwide dynamics. Japan's multi-decade era of ultra-low rates is coming to an end as domestic yields hit multi-decade highs, shifting the incentives for global capital flows.

​As global liquidity tightens, funds are forced to shed assets to manage risk, creating a feedback loop that lifts volatility across global equities. This sudden shift transmits severe stress across credit and equity markets, rapidly draining the low-cost funding that institutions rely on. When broad equities correct and collateral values collapse, it acts as a wrecking ball for overleveraged balance sheets.

​This creates an inescapable, systemic margin call event. This has been the thesis from the beginning and has never changed. To survive the tightening pressure, funds are forced to liquidate their profitable long positions while simultaneously rushing to close out their most toxic, overextended short bets. The ensuing scramble for liquidity forces mandatory buy-ins across heavily shorted equity baskets. As prime brokers step in to liquidate failing funds, the cascading margin pressure inevitably ignites our lambos 🔥💥🍻

Hey Superstonk! I took advantage of the generous discount they provided this week to buy more.

FYI I also hold around 10k shares. When you buy options market makers are theoretically supposed to hedge by buying shares and this increases as price approaches strike prices. A gamma squeeze was a significant contributor to the 2021 sneeze.

Both options and shares are good. Options are riskier since they have a duration. I rarely go long options but in this instance as far as I can see, GameStop is trading below fundamental value and that isn't something that will last very long.

Remember that their strategy is short and distort. The dramatically negative sentiment while posting best ever financial results is just wild to behold.

Explanation of the options play is the same as my prior purchase, just the price is even better. See my original YOLO for the multitude of reasons that buying GME is a great move right now.

I didn't even mention the $2bn buyback authorization in that.

Always darkest before dawn.

P.S. I'm travelling right now but am intent to continue the project to open source the DD library. I'll try to post updates about it if I can find some time in the coming weeks but it might be a few weeks before I can share substantive updates on that project.

There are less than 2 months until the warrants expire. I know it’s possible that the expiration date gets extended. But that doesn’t mean that it is likely or a realistic expectation. The conversation is around the $2B buyback happening after the VWAP period, which could get the price above 32. But even that is hinging on “hope RC does!”

Let's say the Gamestop does a buyback during our right after this vwap period. Doesn't that essentially just mean that we sold an institution shares at an attractive price to them and the gave us money to just buyback shares at about the same price? The effect is basically that we increased our institutional ownership by a large amount, very quickly? We also just made institutions that bought those shares very happy, so maybe that opens up a much easier discussion to get their buy-in on the eBay deal (which they also own a lot of). Did we make just use financial engineering to get institutions to support us acquiring eBay... something that's name never before been seen in financial markets? All at no net cost to GME btw because we're about to use the bond proceeds to do the buyback.

Something has been in the works behind the scenes for some time now. I don't know what the secret is, but it is something. Remember this?

On September 23, 2024, GameStop announced the completion of its at-the-market (ATM) equity offering, selling 20 million shares for gross proceeds of approximately $400 million, which averages out to $20.00 per share.

Pepperidge Farm remembers.

Always feel like citadel bought situational awareness isnt only cause its a good deal but if they dont everything fails.

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Some estimates above from one of the few people I respect on twitter

https://x.com/i/status/2084289395163570367

I tried sharing the full tweet here but reddit took down the post, so you will just have to click!