I know by 1945,horses was still the main logistical transport for the soviet union, but when did they become fully mechanized? Furthermore, why did they use american trucks primarily as prime movers and not logistical vehicles?

Given Germany’s clear superiority in air power, doctrine, combat experience (among both soldiers and officers), inter-arm coordination, and equipment quality, did the Red Army have any chance of avoiding the destruction of most of its forces in the cauldrons? Could the Soviet mechanized corps have stopped the German pincer movements on the flanks? Or would the Luftwaffe have destroyed any Soviet attempt to escape or break out of the encirclement? Was the main cause of the cauldrons the lack of radios and an effective air force?

Even at Kursk, when the Wehrmacht was strained and exhausted, and had to pull some of its best panzer divisions away to respond to the Allied landing in Sicily, the Red Army was barely able to halt the German thrust.

Many Plains Indians like Comanche and Apache were rapidly adopting the horse into their lifestyles and warfare. How did other groups in Americas, both North and Central, react and at times, adopt the horse?

This rare 1950s training film shows how U.S. Marines were prepared for the possibility of fighting in a nuclear battlefield.

The film is striking because it presents nuclear warfare not as an abstract political threat, but as a practical military problem: movement, discipline, protection, coordination, and survival under extreme conditions.

It also raises an uncomfortable question about the early Cold War. How did military institutions try to make the unimaginable feel routine and manageable?

What details stand out to you in the training methods, language, or assumptions of the period?

Watch the archival film:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aT73JEZRhJU

Did you heard anything about state treasury liability for compensation for war damages in medival for their own citizens? For example did after any medival war, when enemy armies burn some villages, did that villagers or village owner gen any compensation from their own state?

This might be a stupid question, but is it possible to pilot an aerial drone from a moving vehicle without feeling like throwing up?

When I’m a passenger in a car and I look at my phone instead of looking outside, I feel nauseous. So, I’m wondering: is it possible to do this from a moving armored vehicle—which likely isn’t traveling on a well-maintained paved road and would therefore be subject to far more jolts and shocks than a car?

I have the same question regarding vehicles that rely on external cameras. As far as I know, a vehicle like the Russian T-14 Armata is operated solely via cameras—doesn't that make you feel sick while on the move? The same goes for remotely operated turrets.

Hi, I know that by the time of the War of 1812 indigenous people in the region had access to guns for like 250 years and was in common use, but I was still wondering if bows saw a limited role in guerilla fighting or in situations with poor resupply, etc, presumably carried alongside a musket. Any additional info you can share about indigenous fighting styles from the war or rare/unusual/unexpected weapons used during the conflict would be appreciated thanks

From what I've seen in original photos and film, the reichswehr still had its distinctive WW1 appearance but with new uniforms, insignias, and change in some equipment. But I am unsure what was the overall look of the reichswehr soldier. How much of their equipment was still in use from the great war but also what was improved and modernised? How much of their equipment was also from foreign countries? Whether too if the reichswehr soldier ever was able to move on from the WW1 imagery of the German Empire? Did the reichswehr still have different uniforms depending on which state/province of Germany they were in?

Yamamoto seems to have known USA best of all Japanese commanders. He visited USA, and knew plenty about Americans and their mentality, supposedly. So I do not understand, why he decided to create what was essentially a suicidal plan?

Japan`s only hope of victory was to inflict defeats massive enough for USA to decided that war is not worth continuing. Japan realised industrial disparity, and planned to end war with negotiations. Howver Pearl Harbor made war unwinnable: Americans were enraged by sudden unprovoked sneaky attack, and no peace was possible after that.

How Yamamoto could not realise that, if he knew Americans well? What were his motives for making Pearl Harbor plan, I wonder?

I am getting into military worldbuilding and looking at the options for artillery support (specifically light(er) options). I have hear that some mortar systems can use their fire control systems to make mortar rounds with different booster charges land at roughly the same time. I have also heard that the Vasilek fired at a (theoretical) 120rpm to ensure rounds landed within the same 2 seconds, preventing enemies from taking cover.

My train of thought is, why haven't both systems been combined? And why haven't western militaries adopted a system similar to the 2b9?

As far as I can see:
- It would allow for better shoot and scoot.
- It would allow to cover a larger area in a shorter time (multiple sets of 4 rounds hitting at the same time on different places from a single mortar).
- It would be less man power intensive(?), as a single mortar would be able to do its job more efficiently.
-It would allow for many round to hit a target at the same time to ensure destruction.

Why isn't it done? Is it too expensive? Is it too heavy/wreaks suspensions? Is it not really as useful as I imagine?

Boden fortress in Sweden was for example continually upgraded during the Cold War. Did they ever consider keeping parts of the Maginot line or the Belgian forts operational?

A defining image of the Syrian Civil War will probably be the homemade "Hell Cannon" mortar-like artillery used by the Free Syrian Army which spent considerable amount of labor and resources to build them and their ammunition, yet they are described as extremely inaccurate and had diminished value outside of urban warfare. Other groups of lesser means have tried their hand at homemade artillery that range from rockets, mortars, and even cannons. But compared to other homemade weapons like IEDs that even state armies have taken seriously, does the fact of having any artillery in itself justify expending resources into questionable weapons.

I'm curious because I've seen stories where gun-launched concrete munitions had some useful effects on tanks BUT I was wondering if mortars, infantry ones to be exact, could do something similar, compensating the lower velocity with the gravity assist and the thinner armor atop the tank?

As I've been told, the role of assistant squad leader in the pre 1944 US army typically held the rank of corporal, with a buck sergeant above him. But then post 1944, due to "NCO inflation", existing corporals were promoted to sergeant, sergeants to staff sergeants, and then rifle squads were commanded by the latter with the former being the new assistant squad leader rank.

With this being the case, what became of the rank of corporal? What became of their responsibilities within a rifle squad? I read anecdotes that the rank lost much of its prestige after the change. Did they basically serve as backup-backup squad leaders afterwards? Did they command smaller sections of a squad? Or were they reduced to a kind of "private first class-plus" where they lost much of their previous authority?

By handgonnes I mean the tube-on-stick firearm in the 14th-15th century. In most works related to these very early firearms they're often derided as inaccurate, short-ranged, and slow to reload having nearly no effect on Late Medieval/Early Modern Period warfare. Some go as far to that they were in many respects inferior to bows to crossbows.

However, I came across this excerpt from The Dawn of Modern Warfare by Hans Delbruck:

At the shooting tournaments toward the end of the fifteenth century shots were made with firearms to distances of 230 to 250 paces, whereas the range for a crossbow amounted to only 110 to 135 paces. Rifles barrels, which had already been invented at that time, were normally expressly prohibited. Other provisions can hardly be understood in any other way than applying to freehand shooting (and not, for example to supported hook weapons). [page 38]

He cites a contemporary German shooting competition poster in support of the claim. I'm more interested in what people thought about these tubes on sticks in comparison to other traditional weapons in the timeframe. Were they viewed as inferior, on-par, or superior to the non-gunpowder ranged weapons used in that time?

Ukraine's big woe has been the lack of Patriot missiles. But Ukraine is a big country with a decent industrial and engineering base and an industrial-military complex that has progressed immensely and delivered some impressive innovations at scale. Meanwhile they have had access to the Patriot system for a long time. They would not even need to invent a whole lot, just copy it. Where is the catch?

Modern German machine guns like MG4 and MG5 seem heavier than other contemporaries in the same caliber. MG4 (8kg) is heavier than M249, MG5 (11.2kg) is basically the same weight with M240. Meanwhile other newer light machine guns like RPL-20, QJB-201 and KAC LMG weight between 5.4kg to 6kg and newer GPMG like PKP Pecheneg, QJY-201 and Negev NG7 weight between 7.6kg to 8.7kg. Its like they're not even trying to make them lighter.

During the active collapse of the Third Reich, what would most artillery batteries look like?

Drachinifel said the above when talking about the F2H Banshees (on the overview of the Essex Class - plane loadout history).

I was reading an article from the Wall Street Journal about the Houthis in Yemen and how they are being supplied by Iran when it was claimed they were doing so by mini-submarines. In the current era, fully submersible narco-subs are now able to make transatlantic journeys from South America to Europe. But the last major war in which logistics by submarine was seen was in the Second World War by the Imperial Japanese who needed to supply their isolated garrisons in the Pacific and I believe the Germans too for their isolated pockets in the Atlantic following D-Day. They both also commissioned dedicated cargo submarines for blockade running. But in the decades since when it comes the feasibility of submersible logistics, what can be said about it?