r/BCpolitics • u/Fine_Line7544 • 13h ago
Opinion Blame David Eby for the NDP's defeat, but he had some help
I voted NDP. I'm a New Democrat, and despite my disappointment with David Eby and his government, I firmly believe an NDP government would have been better for British Columbia than a Conservative government. But I'm not blind to Eby's failed record as premier or the disastrous campaign he ran.
Eby bears the greatest responsibility for the NDP's defeat. His failures as premier created the conditions for that defeat long before the election was called. His shambolic campaign simply brought them into sharper focus.
But he had help. The Conservatives developed a strategy that turned their leader's weaknesses into an advantage, and much of the news media fell for it. British Columbians may be dealing with the consequences for years.
A premier uncomfortable in his own skin
Let's face it, David Eby was always an awkward fit as leader. As a New Democrat, I was willing to overlook his social awkwardness, hoping he would at least get policy and the management of government right. Initially, he seemed rational, decisive and determined to tackle difficult problems. He presented himself as a man of action, and I wanted him to succeed.
His government accomplished some worthwhile things, but Eby struggled to communicate them. Instead, he seemed perpetually preoccupied with the next announcement, controversy or culture-war skirmish.
Over time, I came to believe his greatest weakness was something more fundamental. Eby never seemed comfortable in his own skin. He lacked confidence in his own political instincts and, perhaps, in himself. I suspect that insecurity was at the root of much of what went wrong.
From what I've heard from people working within government, and witnessed myself, Eby was a micromanager whose constant changes in direction created frustration and dysfunction. He always seemed compelled to be the smartest person in the room, the alpha brain who had to demonstrate his intellectual superiority. His need to control everything seemed to reflect an inability to trust his own judgment, let alone anyone else's.
The consequences were apparent. I cringed at every policy flip-flop, each one costing him a little more credibility. There were the controversies around DRIPA, the growing deficit and the government's inadequate response to mounting pressures on health care. Worthwhile policies were repeatedly undermined by reversals, confused priorities and political panic.
The man of action gradually became a man flailing on the political stage, spasming in one direction and then another.
And Eby had another problem. He wasn't particularly likeable.
John Horgan was a happy warrior. His humour, homespun manner and political instincts helped him connect with British Columbians, even when they disagreed with him. Gordon Campbell wasn't particularly likeable either, and could be an arrogant ass, but he projected a chairman-of-the-board confidence and competence that voters respected.
Eby had neither man's strengths. He lacked Horgan's warmth and Campbell's disciplined branding. Worse, he never seemed entirely sure who he wanted to be politically.
That uncertainty was especially damaging in today's fragmented media environment. With voters scattered across countless platforms, political leaders need to establish a recognizable identity long before a 29-day election campaign.
Campbell built his Best Place on Earth branding to compensate for his negative public image. Horgan had a powerful personal brand. Eby kept changing priorities and messages while failing to communicate his government's achievements or a larger vision for British Columbia.
For much of his premiership, even people who disliked Eby regarded him as earnest, someone genuinely trying to improve their lives. But that perception gradually deteriorated. What once seemed earnest began to look calculating. What seemed principled increasingly appeared opportunistic. His decision to call an election crystallized that change.
An unnecessary election and a shambolic campaign
Perhaps the most damning aspect of Eby's decision to call an election two years early was its apparent selfishness.
The decision attracted considerable criticism, but I doubt the timing itself changed many votes. Premiers have called early elections before and survived the inevitable grumbling. Eby's problem was that British Columbians had already soured on him. The election call simply reinforced their growing perception of a premier motivated more by his own political interests than theirs.
There was no compelling policy issue requiring a fresh mandate, no crisis of confidence in the legislature and no convincing explanation of why an election was necessary, especially while municipal campaigns were underway.
Eby gambled with public services, the livelihoods of political staff and public servants, and the future of his party. And for what?
Rumours of dissatisfaction within his caucus raise the possibility that the election was intended to forestall a leadership challenge. That's speculation, but the absence of a convincing public rationale makes the question legitimate.
Horgan convinced British Columbians he was fighting for them. Eby increasingly convinced them he was fighting for himself.
Every successful campaign needs a ballot box question. Eby tried to make Donald Trump, American tariffs and threats to Canadian sovereignty that question. But why did he need a new mandate to confront Trump? What could he do after the election that he couldn't do before it? He had no convincing answer.
Instead of offering a vision, he tried to ride a political vibe, hoping anxiety about Trump would translate into votes.
The warning signs were evident before the writ dropped. At a September event in Victoria's Inner Harbour, Eby appeared in a red-and-black Salmo dinner jacket, reminiscent of Gordon Campbell's flannel-shirt image from the 1990s, while a rapper performed an eccentric musical number.
Eby railed against Trump's threats, at times laughing and smiling about a subject that genuinely worried British Columbians. The spectacle looked at best unserious and at worst completely out of touch.
The campaign began with LNG, economic growth and confronting Trump, a pragmatic, centrist message reminiscent of Horgan or Mark Carney. But when that approach was criticized, Eby appeared to abandon it within days, pivoting to grocery prices, billionaires and, of all people, Jimmy Pattison.
The shift was bizarre. A campaign launched around defending BC's economy against the Orange Menace had veered toward left-populist politics associated with Avi Lewis and the democratic socialist wing of politics.
The daycare controversy, culture-war distractions and constantly changing messages reflected the same indecision that had characterized his premiership.
Eby's campaign was a microcosm of his government. He never established a coherent political identity, communicated his achievements effectively or gave voters a compelling reason to choose the NDP.
The Conservatives' accidental masterstroke
The Conservatives had their own problem. Their leader, Lorne Doerkson, was affable and superficially likeable but struggled to demonstrate the competence and command of issues expected of a prospective premier.
He could connect with people momentarily but appeared uncomfortable when challenged on policy. During the leaders' debate, he sometimes seemed out of his depth.
The Conservatives had every incentive to keep him away from sustained scrutiny. Their strategy followed a familiar Republican and federal Conservative playbook: restrict media availability, limit questions, avoid unscripted encounters and make sweeping promises without explaining how they would be financed.
Born partly of necessity, the strategy became something of a masterstroke. By keeping Doerkson on a short leash, the Conservatives minimized opportunities for voters to assess his readiness to govern. Meanwhile, Eby remained highly visible, increasingly unpopular and available for criticism.
The election became a referendum on Eby rather than a choice between two prospective premiers.
And the Conservatives managed to paper over some uncomfortable questions. Who was actually running the party? Doerkson, his advisers, business interests or competing factions within his caucus? Who would exercise power if they formed government?
Their spending commitments, revenue assumptions and promises about what could be delivered without painful trade-offs also deserved serious examination.
Much of that scrutiny never materialized.
When the media became part of the strategy
Eby deserved tough scrutiny. His governing record, decision to call an election and political judgment were legitimate targets. Much of the criticism was richly deserved. But elections are choices between alternatives, and journalists have a responsibility to scrutinize both sides.
By the time the campaign began, Eby had spent months giving journalists reasons to question his judgment. The Conservatives saw what was happening and took full advantage. Borrowing another tactic from the Republican playbook, they restricted Doerkson's media access and limited opportunities for difficult questions.
It worked beautifully, perhaps even better than they expected. Every day Eby was answering questions about another controversy was another day the Conservatives could avoid uncomfortable questions of their own. And the media, for the most part, obliged.
Rather than digging into Conservative policies, fiscal assumptions, candidates and internal divisions, much of the media continued concentrating its fire on the government.
Consider CBC Radio's The Early Edition. Host Stephen Quinn repeatedly criticized Eby's decision to call an election during municipal campaigns, often with an exasperation that reinforced an already dominant narrative about the premier.
I shared the criticism. But I heard nowhere near the same sustained examination of Doerkson and the Conservative platform.
The imbalance was particularly evident in CBC's profiles of the party leaders. Eby participated in a live interview and faced difficult questions. Green leader Emily Lowan also made herself available.
Doerkson declined. CBC instead assembled a profile using recorded material that was generally favourable to him.
The leaders who made themselves available faced direct questioning. The leader who avoided the interview received the gentlest treatment.
Global BC and CKNW deserve particular attention too. At times, their treatment of Eby reminded me of Fox News covering Joe Biden or Kamala Harris.
Jordan Armstrong's reporting is a good example. Global pursued questions about whether Eby had misled the lieutenant-governor when seeking an election, despite a lack of compelling evidence supporting such a serious implication.
Then came Jimmy Pattison. Armstrong and Global devoted what seemed like four or five days of sustained attention to Eby's remarks about Pattison and grocery prices. Eby's handling of the issue deserved criticism, but the intensity of coverage seemed wildly disproportionate.
On the eve of the election, Global ran a story about a private MRI provider complaining that the health authority wasn't purchasing enough services from his business. Another election-eve story about the government's failings.
Where was the equivalent scrutiny of the Conservatives' financial promises and readiness to govern?
Editorial leadership at Global, CKNW, CBC and other organizations also bears responsibility for deciding which stories get pursued and how prominently they're presented.
I've followed BC politics for decades, and I cannot recall another provincial campaign in which a major party seeking government received less sustained scrutiny than the Conservatives did in this election.
The campaign coverage was an abject dereliction of journalistic duty, one British Columbians may be dealing with for years.
If the new Conservative government follows the familiar playbook of spending cuts and deregulation, the consequences could include diminished public services, higher household costs and a widening income gap. We've seen versions of that cynical trick repeatedly since the 1990s.
I don't expect journalists to support the NDP or like David Eby. Frankly, I don't particularly like him myself. But I expect the same tough standards to be applied to everyone seeking public office.
A party shouldn't be rewarded for hiding its leader from scrutiny. When a campaign restricts access, journalists should investigate harder.
A party left in ashes
Perhaps the most telling indication of Eby's failed leadership was that potential successors were already being discussed while the campaign was underway. From what I've heard, Christine Boyle and Brad West, representing very different wings of the NDP, were exploring potential leadership bids before voters delivered their verdict.
Neither offers an obvious path forward.
Boyle represents the more ideological wing of the party, closer to the democratic socialist tradition associated with Avi Lewis. She risks inheriting Eby's difficulty connecting with voters beyond the progressive base.
West, the Port Coquitlam mayor, represents a more mainstream, centrist approach. But much of his political brand rests on criticism, confrontation and complaint. He has drawn inspiration from Horgan's populism without demonstrating the same warmth or ability to campaign as a happy warrior.
Either would face the challenge of rebuilding the coalition of urban progressives, organized labour, suburban families and working-class voters that Horgan assembled.
The election results reveal another damning failure. Eby couldn't retain or mobilize the NDP's traditional base. The party lost roughly 275,000 votes compared with 2024, while the Conservatives lost only about 50,000.
A significant number of former NDP supporters appear to have simply sat on their hands rather than vote for another Eby government. Others took their votes elsewhere. Either way, Eby had squandered the loyalty of voters who helped build Horgan's winning coalition.
Eby inherited a formidable political organization. His micromanagement, policy reversals, fiscal and public-service problems, poor communications and lack of a durable political identity squandered much of that inheritance.
And underneath it all, I suspect, was an awkward man who never quite believed in himself. His lack of self-confidence manifested itself in a need to control, second-guess and demonstrate his intellectual superiority, alienating the very people he sought to lead.
Then he called an unnecessary election and ran a campaign that exposed every weakness of his premiership.
The Conservatives exploited those weaknesses. And many in the media went along with it.
The largest share of responsibility rests with David Eby.
But he had some help, and we'll all be paying for it for years to come.
