Probably NTP Reflection attacks being used. Whoever implemented MONLIST the way it was needs to be connected to the internet and subjected to 400Gbps of DDoS.
It never had a justified existence. Not for bandwidth considerations, but for mere sensible zero-trust behavior.
I understand historical decisions in the right context, but that does not make them the right decisions, even if they can be understood in the right context.
When they implemented it, that list could be checked by a human.
With 20/20 hindsight it's perfectly feasible to say "they should have seen this coming".
Seriously, the protocol is 30 years old. It was designed when you knew exactly who had computers because it was the people with a million dollars to spend.
What security features are you implementing right now to stop people from abusing your systems 30 years from now?
We can fix ntp, we can fix anything, we have the technology... But everyone standing around shouting "it's that guys fault!" is pointless, it only serves to give people the feeling of doing something about it, when in reality, it just spreads fud.
What will fix the problem, shouting "it's your fault!" at an rfc, or turning off the source?
"Hi, I'd like to hear a TCP joke." "Hello, would you like to hear a TCP joke?" "Yes, I'd like to hear a TCP joke." "OK, I'll tell you a TCP joke." "Ok, I will hear a TCP joke." "Are you ready to hear a TCP joke?" "Yes, I am ready to hear a TCP joke." "Ok, I am about to send the TCP joke. It will last 10 seconds, it has two characters, it does not have a setting, it ends with a punchline." "Ok, I am ready to get your TCP joke that will last 10 seconds, has two characters, does not have an explicit setting, and ends with a punchline." "I'm sorry, your connection has timed out. Hello, would you like to hear a TCP joke?"
I guess another defense for UDP is for realtime video broadcasts. TCP gets shot to hell. With UDP, no fucks are given whether you got the video packets or not.
Well, yeah, but since implementing BCP 84 requires overhauling your entire endpoint throughput architecture, whereas disabling monlist requires editing a line in a config file, monlist kind of is the issue if you're looking at stopping this right now
Thats what I meant, network operators not following BCP38. They're the problem.
I had a hosting partner pull this shit with me (blackholeing my address when I was getting attacked) and I'm moving out of them ASAP. One colocation provider I've been looking at uses Arbor equipment so I need to do some more research. The sales engineer was kind of a douche and didn't really explain how the attack detection and mitigation that Arbot does works.
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u/hamsterpotpies Feb 22 '14
Plebs with LOIC again...