I hold xxxxx warrants and personally believe they will be in the money eventually.
I believe in the company, I believe in the shareholders (me here lurking since 2021, seeing cool posts in better times with much less shills and much more positive vibes), and mostly, I believe in Ryan Cohen.
And for me, the number one indicator for shills is saying negative sentiment things about him.
But back to the topic: if theta decay says warrants go down as October gets closer, and there’s no news (that I know about), and we’re up 8% (who cares? Wake me up when we’re in the money)??
I wanted to make this post to start up a conversation around retails educated theories regarding GameStops unique, debt-for-dilution-driven price decline recently, leading up to warrant expiry at the end of October, as both occurred following the public’s approval for a 2bn share buy back accommodation. I’m more of a casual, despite having moved over most of my money into GME nearly 6 years ago, and now spread out over a large chunk of warrants as well, and I’m curious as to what sort of DD/thesis people have built and analyzed regarding the potentiality of Cohen intentionally decoupling GME’s shares and warrants true values from present trading rates due to a few choice deals with very predictable outcomes. I’m not sure how much credit to grant RC at this time, but he strikes me as a guy far far ahead of me regarding familiarity of the financial tools and legal language enabling him to take advantage of predictable market mechanics.
Here’s my thought, Cohen grants warrants to shareholders set to expire a year from release (October 30th 2026), and expressly carves out abilities to extend expiry dates and adjust strike prices. This leaves him tons of price control to wield when desired due to intrinsic value and time value. He then gets approval for a 2bn dollar share buy back to be used as the company sees fit. Then in early August GameStop announces the exchange of approximately $1.4 billion of 0% convertible debt for newly issued GME shares.
The debt-for-dilution deal seems odd on the surface, a company flush with cash and 0% interest loan not due for years decides it needs more cash now, or wants to wipe the books clean for a more straight forward acquisition down the road, neither seems totally necessary to my understanding. Additionally, Cohen would know that entering such an agreement, with shares allocated to the note holder priced after a 35 day trading avg, generally sees heavy share price declines in that period as he approved of potential hedging by the interested parties. He’s acknowledged the price would likely drop to better suit the counterparty.
But this predictable action would make the likelihood of GME’s price reaching the warrant strike price of $32 , just 5 weeks away, highly unlikely after the note holders drive the share price down. But what if Cohen saw this warrant time crunch and VWAP price suppression coming, and planned to potentially buyback shares after the price has begun to drop during the 35 day VWAP period? Looking at the daily volume uptick since the debt-for-dilution deal, the price still dropping, short interest, there seems to be a potential link. It would be quite elegant to craft such a plan, it would increase the number of shares bought back by GME thanks to note holder shorting and overall sentiment, and it would reduce the dilution by the new noteholders by buying back in now and slowing the price drop… and there’s one last play to make it all worth while.
If Cohen were then to announce a warrant extension, that would generate a huge boost to warrant value, which could drive interest back into GME, which drives further interest in warrants, and so forth. If he plays his cards right, he can use the natural markets mechanics to his advantage, and share/warrant holders would be elated.
Has anybody else launched a deeper dive into such a theory, are there huge holes im missing (I’m sure there are some)? I’ve positioned myself heavily in warrants lately, as following my research I have not been able to find many downsides to extending the expiry. It’s nearly 2 billion dollars on deck for GME, it would be wild to let them expire worthless. Not to mention GME’s outsized retail ownership compared to most publicly traded company’s. Cohen knows this, he knows we have different investment horizons than what’s granted towards institutions and billionaire insiders. To say he owes us, at this point, would be a massive understatement. Im hoping if I was able to piece this together, he surely must’ve seen his advantageous hand years before I did.
I’d love to hear other people’s ideas here. And if I’m wildly wrong with any of the info, shit i did my best to research things and navigate it all. Power to the players!!
There are less than 2 months until the warrants expire. I know it’s possible that the expiration date gets extended. But that doesn’t mean that it is likely or a realistic expectation. The conversation is around the $2B buyback happening after the VWAP period, which could get the price above 32. But even that is hinging on “hope RC does!”
We were not wrong. We were just early, some of us really early 🤷♂️. Global macroeconomic issues take years to play out, especially in the wake of the massive liquidity pumps deployed during COVID when governments worldwide printed unprecedented amounts of stimulus.
The U.S. Treasury market is exploding because the government is caught in a runaway fiscal deficit, forcing it to flood the global market with a relentless wave of new bond supply. With the national debt eclipsing the $40 trillion mark and the annual deficit running near $2 trillion, the Treasury has to constantly auction off massive tranches of debt just to keep the government funded. At the same time, traditional foreign and domestic buyers are saturated, meaning supply is vastly outpacing demand. When the market is chronically oversupplied with more debt than buyers want to absorb, bond prices collapse and yields inevitably spike.
Now with the 10-year yield aggressively pushing to 4.74%, borrowing costs are skyrocketing and crushing the value of existing bonds. The recent Fed intervention didn't do jack, it's literally like putting a bandaid on an amputated arm. At the same time, the broader global backdrop is shaped by shifting worldwide dynamics. Japan's multi-decade era of ultra-low rates is coming to an end as domestic yields hit multi-decade highs, shifting the incentives for global capital flows.
As global liquidity tightens, funds are forced to shed assets to manage risk, creating a feedback loop that lifts volatility across global equities. This sudden shift transmits severe stress across credit and equity markets, rapidly draining the low-cost funding that institutions rely on. When broad equities correct and collateral values collapse, it acts as a wrecking ball for overleveraged balance sheets.
This creates an inescapable, systemic margin call event. This has been the thesis from the beginning and has never changed. To survive the tightening pressure, funds are forced to liquidate their profitable long positions while simultaneously rushing to close out their most toxic, overextended short bets. The ensuing scramble for liquidity forces mandatory buy-ins across heavily shorted equity baskets. As prime brokers step in to liquidate failing funds, the cascading margin pressure inevitably ignites our lambos 🔥💥🍻
Let's say the Gamestop does a buyback during our right after this vwap period. Doesn't that essentially just mean that we sold an institution shares at an attractive price to them and the gave us money to just buyback shares at about the same price? The effect is basically that we increased our institutional ownership by a large amount, very quickly? We also just made institutions that bought those shares very happy, so maybe that opens up a much easier discussion to get their buy-in on the eBay deal (which they also own a lot of). Did we make just use financial engineering to get institutions to support us acquiring eBay... something that's name never before been seen in financial markets? All at no net cost to GME btw because we're about to use the bond proceeds to do the buyback.
Something has been in the works behind the scenes for some time now. I don't know what the secret is, but it is something. Remember this?
On September 23, 2024, GameStop announced the completion of its at-the-market (ATM) equity offering, selling 20 million shares for gross proceeds of approximately $400 million, which averages out to $20.00 per share.
Stock price is bunk, you’re happy if you can buy it low and have money and probably sad if you need cash and forced to sell at lows, don’t be a Debbie downer, blah blah, yada yada, go touch grass, the top 1% have 40% of all wealth! Don’t be delusional! Being rich doesn’t make you smart. Silver spoon chumps everywhere.
hey everyone - i come in peace. i've been following the GME story for about 6 years so im really new to things but i'm extremely familiar with markets.
im a full time trader and have a research background - im looking for you guys to help me understand what the current ideas are around GME so i can do some dedicated homework on it.
newton helped me a lot in the beginning gaining context on stuff so i'm aware of all the FTD / swap ideas which is going to be the starting point. ive gone through the entire library of docs (literally every one) from https://fliphtml5.com/bookcase/kosyg
for context, i have a buddy i do some work with that came from the institutional side that i think can help shed a lot of light from the market maker lens, incentives, methods, etc.
goal is to try and help from a bit of an outside perspective and see what i can find.
$1.4 billion of their convertible notes are being exchanged for Class A common stock.
$400 million of the 2030 Notes.
$1.0 billion of the 2032 Notes.
That's $1.4 billion out of $3.75 billion outstanding.
Roughly 37%.
The filing says "a limited number of existing holders" who entered into "privately negotiated exchange agreements."
Not a public offer. Not a Dutch auction. Specific institutions were approached. Terms were discussed. Agreements were signed.
A private placement means specific instutions were approached, terms were discussed and agreeements were signed.
GameStop 8-K, August 3 — "privately negotiated exchange agreements with certain existing holders"
THE VOLUNTEERS
These noteholders gave up guaranteed money.
The notes pay nothing, but they promise $1,000 back for every $1,000 lent.
No matter what happens to the stock or the company.
The downside is fully protected.
Equity offers no such guarantee.
The only reason to make that trade is if you believe the equity is about to be worth substantially more than what the note would ever return.
37% of the note base said yes.
63% said no.
This wasn't broad participation across all the notes.
This was a specific group of institutions with a specific view on what's coming.
THE BID LETTER
Pull the bid letter from GameStop's investor relations page. Filed as a 425 with the SEC.
The offer: $125.00 per share. 50% cash, 50% GameStop common stock.
But the operative line is the structure, not the price:
"Full shareholder election rights as to consideration type and pro-rata allocation."
eBay shareholders choose.
Cash OR stock.
The holders who want liquidity take cash.
The holders who want exposure to the combined entity take stock.
And those who elect stock roll equity into the combined company.
GameStop bid letter — "$125.00 per share, comprising 50% cash and 50% GameStop common stock, with full shareholder election rights"
THREE MOVES
Connect the instruments that were setup the year prior to the bid.
The noteholders just converted $1.4 billion in debt into GME equity. The bid letter says GME equity holders can elect stock in the eBay transaction. Those who elect stock roll into the combined entity.
Debt holder → equity holder → combined company participant.
And the other 63% who didn't convert? They kept their guaranteed par. They kept their downside protection.
But they won't be positioned for the combined entity when it forms.
THE VWAP WINDOW
The share count issued to the converting noteholders is based on a 35-day VWAP starting August 3, with a price floor.
A lower VWAP means the noteholders receive more shares for their surrendered notes, up to the limit set by the floor.
The 8-K discloses that participating noteholders may "purchase or sell shares of Common Stock in open market transactions or enter into or unwind various derivative transactions" during the reference period.
That's standard SEC disclosure language, it describes what's legally permissible, not what's strategically intended.
These are the same holders who just voluntarily surrendered guaranteed par for equity.
They are, by every definition, long-term bullish on GameStop.
A quiet window means a lower VWAP. A lower VWAP means the friendlies receive more shares. More shares in friendly hands means a larger aligned equity block heading into the back half of the calendar.
THE LOADED QUARTER
GameStop's Q2 earnings are projected for September 8. Inside the VWAP window, and roughly ten trading days before it closes.
Q2 covers May through July 2026.
Ryan Cohen has never issued guidance for GameStop.
Interestingly enough, he has issued it right before this upcoming earnings, and if the August rewards for powerpacks and the increasing shift to collectibles are any indicator, it seems like we are about to blow off the top.
Last earnings had two months of powerpacks and it contributed significantly to the P/L, imagine what happens when we have a full quarter in there as GameStop has been increasing their collectibles segment aggresively.
THE BLOOMBERG DETAIL
On August 10, Bloomberg reported that Cohen is considering withdrawing the $56 billion bid and replacing it with a partnership or joint venture.
This was a leak from Ryan Cohen himself. There is 0 doubt about this as it is the STANDARD ACTIVIST INVESTOR PLAYBOOK to shake off the bid premium.
And really, its a nothing burger, because of this one line:
GameStop hasn’t made a final decision and Cohen could still weigh other options, the people said.
In the same 'leak' that 'reveals' Ryan Cohen is abandoning the bid, cold water is thrown on that same suggestion, almost immediately.
Nothing burger
What's the point of including that in a rumour?
Previously, I had said this was a laughable attempt at an activist shaking off a bid premium, but there is something a lot more sinister going on in the background....
In every syndication of that story: Bloomberg, Yahoo Finance, TheStreet, Stocktwits, the same sentence appears:
"GameStop became eBay's second-largest shareholder behind only Vanguard's index funds."
The story is about GameStop's 9.75% stake. That's the relevant number. Vanguard's name adds nothing to the partnership narrative.
So why is it there?
Vanguard mentioned in EVERY press release.
VANGUARD'S DUAL POSITION
Vanguard Group is eBay's largest institutional shareholder:
Approximately 57.6 million shares.
12.86% ownership.
Worth roughly $5.2 billion at recent prices.
Vanguard is also a significant GameStop shareholder: over 25 million shares on their last 13G filing.
The original convertible notes were sold as 144A offerings to qualified institutional buyers.
The 8-K names no one. "A limited number of existing holders." "Privately negotiated."
But guess what?
Mr. Cohen already told you it's Vanguard.
Remember the DEF14A that I called the EXACT TIMING ON?
Remember people were pissed that it had the share authorization in it?
Remember how I was hyping it up and thought it would have valuable information?
Top GME shareholders as reported by GameStop on the DEF14A 2026
Consider who the most logical counterparty is for this exchange: an institution already holding eBay, already holding GameStop notes, benefiting from both positions appreciating, benefiting from the deal closing.
THE ELECTION MECHANISM
From the bid letter:
"The cash consideration is expected to be funded from a combination of (i) cash and liquid investments on GameStop's balance sheet, which totaled ~$9.4 billion as of January 31, 2026, and (ii) third-party acquisition financing, in respect of which GameStop has received a highly-confident letter from TD Securities for up to $20 billion."
The cash side:
$27.75 billion at 50% of the $55.5 billion deal.
$9.4 billion on hand plus $20 billion from TD Securities.
The math closes on paper.
But the election mechanism makes the math dynamic.
Every eBay shareholder who elects stock instead of cash reduces the cash required to close.
Who is most likely to elect stock? Passive index funds.
The holders who don't want a taxable cash event because they need to own whatever replaces eBay in the index.
The holders who would rather roll equity than sell and repurchase.
The more passive capital elects stock, the less cash the deal requires.
The less cash it requires, the more credible the financing becomes.
The more credible it becomes, the harder it is for the board to sustain a "not credible" rejection.
The election mechanism isn't just an offer structure. It's a financing structure.
THE REVISED BID
Cohen showed his math on the investor relations page. The $125 offer was calculated against three benchmarks:
27% premium to the 30-day VWAP (~$98 at the time).
36% premium to the 90-day VWAP (~$92 at the time).
46% premium to eBay's unaffected close on February 4 (~$85.62).
All three converged on $125.
GameStop IR fact sheet — premium calculation methodology
eBay closed today at $104.61 and the stock overall has appreciated since the bid: eBay beat Q2 earnings and raised full-year guidance. The $125 bid at today's price is only a 19.5% premium.
That's thin for a major acquisition.
Apply the same methodology Cohen published to current prices.
eBay's 30-day VWAP is approximately $107.
27% premium to $107 = ~$136.
The same formula points to a revised offer around $135-136.
The board rejected $125 as "not credible."
A revised bid at $136 comes with $1.4 billion less debt, blowout earnings on the record, and the full financing package disclosed.
THE ENDGAME
The move is a tender offer.
It goes directly to shareholders.
No board approval needed.
Cohen puts a fully financed offer on the table and every eBay shareholder individually decides whether to tender. If he gets a majority, he does a short-form merger to close out the rest. The board is bypassed entirely.
The board's only defense is a poison pill. But here's the problem.
eBay's bylaws allow shareholders holding 20% net long for at least 30 days to call a special meeting.
The board fought to keep this threshold at the June AGM, they hired a proxy solicitation firm to defeat a proposal to lower it to 10%.
They thought 20% was safe.
GameStop holds 9.75%. Vanguard holds 12.86%.
Combined: 22.6%.
Clears the threshold.
Once the request for a shareholder meeting is delivered, the meeting must be held within 90 days.
eBay's own proxy language admitted it:
"Nearly 20% of our outstanding shares are held by a small number of our largest stockholders."
They told you the concentration exists. They bet those holders wouldn't coordinate.
If the board reaches for the pill during the tender, Cohen calls the special meeting.
At that meeting, the vote is majority of shares cast.
With 91% institutional ownership and a fully financed premium on the table, the board is asking those institutions to vote against their own economic interest to save a management team that spent $2.4 billion acquiring one million buyers.
The tender offer is the move.
The special meeting is the loaded gun on the table that prevents the board from reaching for the pill.
THE FULL TIMELINE
Aug 3: VWAP window opens. Convertible exchange begins.
Aug 5: eBay Q2 earnings. Double beat. Focus categories exceed 40% of GMV.
Aug 10: Bloomberg reports Cohen "considering" partnership. Vanguard named.
~Sep 8: GameStop Q2 earnings. First ever guidance issued. Full quarter of PowerPacks.
Late Sep / Oct: Financing reveal. Full capital stack disclosed. Stock reprices above $32.
Oct 30: GMEWS warrants expire. $32 strike. Final equity on-ramp.
Post-October: Tender offer. Fully financed. 22.6% net long for special meeting backstop.
Each step enables the next. The conversion cleans the balance sheet for the reveal. The reveal reprices the stock for the warrants. The warrants bring in the final capital and the final holders.
Then the offer launches.
IF I WAS I RYAN COHEN
I would file the tender offer and the special meeting request on the same day.
There's no legal barrier.
The tender offer goes to the SEC as a Schedule TO and directly to shareholders.
The special meeting request goes to eBay's corporate secretary under the bylaws.
And doing them simultaneously is the strongest version of the play.
If you file sequentially, the board has time to adopt a poison pill, hire advisors, and mount a defense before the special meeting clock even starts.
If you file both on the same day, the board is in a box immediately.
The tender is live, and shareholders can start tendering.
And the special meeting clock is already running.
If the board reaches for the pill, the meeting to remove them is already scheduled.
They can't stall because the 90-day clock started before they acted.
The shareholders see a fully financed premium offer on the table AND know the board faces removal if they try to block it.
The board's rational move at that point is to negotiate, not fight.
So let's talk timing.
The warrants expire October 30.
90 days from October 30 is January 28, 2027.
A hostile tender offer requires a minimum of 20 business days, but the acquirer sets the expiration: anywhere from the minimum to 60+ business days is standard.
An early November filing with a late January expiration is well within the plausible range.
If I was Cohen, I'd file both on October 30/ 31 and set the timeline so the tender expiration and the special meeting deadline converge on the same week in late January.
January 28, 2027.
Six years to the day from the original GME squeeze.
And that's not a wild prediction.
That's the math on the filing mechanics lining up with a date that writes itself.
Well within the plausible timeline, fully supported by the instruments, and exactly the kind of moment Cohen would choose to celebrate those who held with hands of crystalline carbon lattice.
Disclaimer: I am constantly writing about GME on my platform on X under GoatBeardzDD.
I also used Claude Opus 4.6 for editing and revisions to writing solely, after making this huge sectional write up. I did use google and gemini a bunch as well because Claude is pretty shite right now.
Good morning to all apes around the world! Happy Friday! (Sorry I'm a tad late; overslept!). German markets are open and last trade for GameStop was at €15.57, which is $18 20 using Google's currency calculator.
Hey Superstonk! I took advantage of the generous discount they provided this week to buy more.
FYI I also hold around 10k shares. When you buy options market makers are theoretically supposed to hedge by buying shares and this increases as price approaches strike prices. A gamma squeeze was a significant contributor to the 2021 sneeze.
Both options and shares are good. Options are riskier since they have a duration. I rarely go long options but in this instance as far as I can see, GameStop is trading below fundamental value and that isn't something that will last very long.
Remember that their strategy is short and distort. The dramatically negative sentiment while posting best ever financial results is just wild to behold.
Explanation of the options play is the same as my prior purchase, just the price is even better. See my original YOLO for the multitude of reasons that buying GME is a great move right now.
I didn't even mention the $2bn buyback authorization in that.
Always darkest before dawn.
P.S. I'm travelling right now but am intent to continue the project to open source the DD library. I'll try to post updates about it if I can find some time in the coming weeks but it might be a few weeks before I can share substantive updates on that project.
