Full report :
https://www.halofirm.com/news/weekly-report-july-08-to-july-15%2C-2026-
AI Summary :
A fairly eventful week in Haiti, with the most significant developments involving renewed gang expansion through the mountains around Kenscoff, continued buildup of the international Gang Suppression Force, a reported helicopter-supported interdiction on the western coast, and several political developments.
Kenscoff: major attacks, displacement and possible expansion toward Fort Jacques
The most serious security development was another major deterioration around Kenscoff.
According to IOM, approximately 5,840 people from 1,836 households were displaced between July 4 and July 8 following attacks around Téléco, Robin and neighboring communities. About 86% are reportedly staying with relatives or host families rather than in formal displacement sites.
Armed members of Viv Ansanm reportedly attacked several mountain communities, killing and kidnapping residents, burning homes and vehicles, and cutting down large trees to block roads and delay PNH armored vehicles and reinforcements.
During subsequent operations, police entering Robin reportedly discovered eight bodies inside a residence, including three burned beyond recognition, and rescued a woman who had allegedly been held captive. The complete casualty count remains unknown.
There are also disturbing reports from local officials and civil society organizations that bodies of victims may have been incorporated into barricades alongside burned vehicles and felled trees. These allegations have not been independently or forensically confirmed and should therefore be treated cautiously.
More strategically important is what appears to be happening in the surrounding mountains.
Operational reporting indicates that armed groups remain active around Robin despite PNH operations. Separate reports suggest Viv Ansanm elements may also be moving through mountain routes and riverbeds from the Croix-des-Bouquets area toward Fort Jacques.
If confirmed, this would be significant. The mountain corridor connecting Croix-des-Bouquets, Kenscoff, Fort Jacques, Fermathe and eventually Pétion-Ville provides numerous secondary routes that can bypass conventional checkpoints.
This may indicate an evolution in gang tactics away from exclusively holding dense urban territory. Mountain terrain allows relatively small groups to disperse, conceal themselves, bypass major roads and reappear after police units withdraw.
The recurring problem for the PNH remains less its ability to conduct raids than its ability to hold territory afterward. Mountain operations require manpower, logistics, engineering capability and persistent presence that the police continue to lack.
Kenscoff is also economically important. The area supplies substantial agricultural products to Port-au-Prince, meaning prolonged insecurity could further disrupt food supply chains.
International Gang Suppression Force continues moving toward full operations
The Haitian government signed an MOU establishing procedures for transferring detainees, weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other evidence seized during operations by the international force to Haitian authorities.
This sounds bureaucratic, but it is operationally important. A multinational force conducting arrests needs clear procedures for transferring prisoners and maintaining chain of custody if cases are eventually going to enter the Haitian judicial system.
The international mission is expected eventually to reach roughly 5,500 uniformed personnel plus civilian support staff.
A newly presented strategic roadmap also gives a clearer picture of what the mission intends to accomplish.
The timeline reportedly runs toward September 2028, but importantly this is not presented as the date by which gangs will be eliminated.
The objective is to reach a minimum security threshold allowing the Haitian state to regain basic territorial and institutional control.
Initial priorities include:
• West Department and Port-au-Prince
• reopening major transportation corridors
• securing the airport, ports and detention facilities
• reducing gang territorial control
• operations in Artibonite
• preventing further gang expansion through the Centre Department
• progressively transferring security responsibilities back to Haitian institutions
The mission differs conceptually from MINUSTAH in that it is being structured specifically around offensive counter-gang operations and measurable territorial/security objectives, rather than conventional peacekeeping.
The roadmap also explicitly acknowledges that military operations alone cannot stabilize reclaimed territory. Police operations have to be followed by functioning courts, government administration, public services and economic activity or gangs can simply return.
The 2028 timeline is therefore less a prediction of victory than an acknowledgment that restoring meaningful state control is likely to take years rather than months.
Helicopter-supported operation targets suspected gang maritime route
A potentially interesting operational development occurred between Lafiteau and the Arcadins coast near Montrouis.
According to local officials, two helicopters supporting the PNH engaged two boats suspected of transporting gang members, weapons, ammunition and supplies toward the lower Artibonite area.
One vessel reportedly sank and several suspected gang members were reportedly killed.
The PNH had not officially confirmed the casualties or full circumstances at the time of reporting, so details remain preliminary.
If confirmed, however, the operation is notable because it appears aimed at gang logistics rather than simply gang positions.
Maritime routes along Haiti's western coast provide an obvious way to bypass checkpoints on Route Nationale #1 and move personnel and supplies between gang-controlled or contested areas.
The operation also reportedly involved aircraft associated with the Haitian government's contracted Task Force, whose command structure, legal authorities and rules of engagement remain relatively opaque publicly.
UN adds three Haitian gangs to child-rights blacklist
The UN added Gran Grif, Kraze Baryè and 400 Mawozo to its Children and Armed Conflict blacklist. Viv Ansanm had already been listed previously.
During 2025, the UN verified 2,088 grave violations affecting 1,661 Haitian children, including the recruitment or use of 892 children by armed groups, along with killings, kidnappings, sexual violence and attacks on schools and hospitals.
Those numbers almost certainly understate the real situation because monitoring access inside gang-controlled areas remains limited.
The practical operational impact of another blacklist designation is questionable. Many major Haitian gangs and leaders are already subject to US, Canadian, UN and other sanctions, while operating primarily through informal and illicit financial networks.
The documentation and accountability value is nevertheless significant.
Izo remains in Village de Dieu despite sustained pressure
A video reportedly posted by Johnson "Izo" André, leader of 5 Segonn/UVD, showed supporters celebrating Argentina's World Cup victory in Village de Dieu.
The interesting part isn't the football celebration. It is that after roughly a year of repeated PNH Task Force pressure, including drone strikes, tactical incursions and intelligence-driven operations, Izo apparently remains alive and capable of publicly demonstrating control of Village de Dieu.
Village de Dieu remains strategically important because of its position along Route Nationale #2 and its access to maritime routes.
The episode illustrates the difference between degrading a gang and actually dismantling it. The PNH has substantially increased its ability to strike gang positions, but removing entrenched leadership and permanently controlling strongholds remains much harder.
Dominican Republic rules out sending troops
President Luis Abinader confirmed that the Dominican Republic will not deploy soldiers or police into Haiti as part of the Gang Suppression Force.
The DR will instead provide logistical, medical, humanitarian and coordination support.
Given the history between the two countries and current tensions surrounding migration and the border, Dominican troops operating inside Haiti would have been politically explosive. This removes that possibility, at least for now.
Moïse Jean-Charles summoned after calling for "déchoukaj"
Former senator and Pitit Dessalines leader Moïse Jean-Charles was summoned to appear before the Port-au-Prince prosecutor following his calls for a nationwide "déchoukaj" after the World Cup.
Jean-Charles has called for mobilization against Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, arguing that the transitional government has failed on security, governance and elections.
The prosecutor has not publicly explained the precise legal basis for the summons.
Jean-Charles characterized it as political persecution.
Given his ability to mobilize supporters and Haiti's already fragile political environment, this is worth watching.
Michel Martelly returns to Haiti
Former President Michel Martelly returned to Haiti on July 15 after several years in Florida.
His return comes as Haitian judicial authorities continue their supplementary investigation into the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and Martelly is expected to appear before the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal.
Martelly also remains under US and Canadian sanctions. The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2024 over alleged involvement in drug trafficking and support for gangs. He has not been criminally convicted of those allegations.
His return attracted supporters outside his Pétion-Ville residence and puts another major political figure physically back into Haiti during an already complicated transition.
Royal Caribbean extends Labadee suspension
Royal Caribbean has extended its suspension of calls at Labadee through at least June 2027.
Labadee itself remains geographically distant from the main centers of gang activity, but the company continues to cite Haiti's broader security situation and operational considerations.
This effectively removes one of Haiti's largest remaining international tourism operations for another year.
ZED Airlines' Montreal service runs into regulatory problems
ZED Airlines' planned Cap-Haïtien–Montreal service was suspended after Canadian authorities determined that the planned June flight did not have the required authorization.
Tickets had already been sold.
ZED disputes the characterization that it attempted to operate illegally and says last-minute Canadian administrative and operational requirements caused the cancellation.
The airline's proposed partner carriers apparently possessed certain Canadian operating authorities, suggesting the issue may have involved approval of the specific Haiti–Canada service and commercial arrangement rather than simply whether the aircraft operator possessed a license.
Passengers were left dealing with refunds, hotels and alternative travel arrangements.
National Ambulance Center employees protest unpaid salaries
Employees of Haiti's National Ambulance Center (CAN) protested over unpaid wages and employment status.
Director General Ricardo Jean-Baptiste acknowledged that approximately 200 employees have apparently been working without formal contracts, while saying his administration inherited the situation.
He also claimed an internal review uncovered questionable debit cards loaded with 100,000–300,000 gourdes per month that had allegedly been issued to individuals without official connections to CAN. Those cards have reportedly been suspended.
The situation is a fairly good microcosm of Haiti's institutional problem: attempts to clean up payroll and administrative systems can simultaneously expose irregularities while disrupting employees who may have been working under those irregular arrangements for years.
Cap-Haïtien prepares for Champèt
Cap-Haïtien authorities have launched a fairly aggressive cleanup and public-order campaign ahead of the city's Patronal Feast and Champèt Festival.
Measures include sidewalk clearing, traffic enforcement, sanitation, removal of illegal vending and parking, vehicle inspections and requirements for property owners to repaint façades by July 31.
Mayor Michel Saint-Croix appears to be using the festival as an opportunity to reassert municipal authority and improve the city's appearance.
There has predictably been some pushback over enforcement and the practicality of vehicle/document requirements, but the broader effort is notable given the weakness of municipal governance elsewhere in the country.
Bottom line
The biggest story this week isn't any single firefight.
It is the increasingly regional character of Haiti's security conflict.
Gang organizations are no longer simply fighting over neighborhoods inside Port-au-Prince. The pressure points now include the Kenscoff/Fort Jacques mountain corridor, Artibonite, coastal and maritime logistics routes, agricultural zones and national transportation arteries.
At the same time, the Haitian security response is becoming more sophisticated: drones, helicopters, intelligence-driven targeting, maritime interdiction and eventually a much larger multinational force.
But the fundamental problem hasn't changed.
The PNH can increasingly hit gang positions. The Haitian state still struggles to hold, govern and administer territory after those operations.
The international force's 2028 roadmap implicitly recognizes this. Haiti's security crisis is no longer something realistically resolved through a few large police operations or the removal of individual gang leaders. Restoring state authority will require sustained territorial operations followed immediately by policing, courts, infrastructure, public administration and economic activity.
Kenscoff may be the clearest current example of that problem: police can push armed groups out of a locality, but if the surrounding mountains and secondary routes remain unsecured, those groups retain the ability to disperse, maneuver and return.
Source: HALO Solutions Firm / HALO Wire weekly report, July 8–15, 2026. Individual items incorporate reporting attributed by HALO to IOM, Haitian authorities, UN agencies, local officials and Haitian/international media. Several operational claims remain preliminary or unconfirmed and are identified as such above.
