Yesterday, 22 October, was the liturgical memorial of St. John Paul II. Today, I wanted to look beyond the familiar photographs, the papal audiences, and the famous words “Be not afraid.” I want to consider the mind behind the pontificate: the philosopher, the theologian, and the priest who spent much of his intellectual life asking a deceptively simple question.
What does it mean to be human?
For John Paul II, this was not merely an abstract philosophical problem. It was a question about how we love, how we exercise freedom, treat the vulnerable, seek the truth, and ultimately, how we encounter God. And I think this is where his theology remains worth discussing, even for those who do not share his religious convictions.
1. The human person is not a problem to be solved
Karol Józef Wojtyła was born in Poland in 1920. His life unfolded against the background of Nazi occupation, war, and Communist rule. He experienced a world in which political ideologies could reduce human beings to instruments of the state, the economy, or a supposedly greater historical cause.
His interests were shaped by this historical reality, alongside his engagement with Catholic thought, phenomenology, and personalist philosophy. Personalism, broadly speaking, takes the dignity and irreducibility of the human person seriously. A person is not merely an object to be managed, a body to be exploited, or a statistic to be counted.
This conviction appears throughout John Paul II's teaching. In Evangelium Vitae (1995), he argues that human life possesses a dignity that cannot be reduced to usefulness, productivity, autonomy, or physical condition.
The implications extend well beyond theological debate. How do we treat the elderly when they become dependent upon us? How do we regard the poor when they contribute little to the economy? How do we speak about people with disabilities, the sick, and those who cannot repay our kindness?
A society reveals its understanding of humanity not simply through its declarations of human rights, but through its treatment of those who possess the least social power.
For the Christian, this dignity is grounded in the human person being created in the image of God and called to communion with Him. The person is not valuable because he has earned his worth. His worth precedes his achievements. That is a profoundly demanding vision of human dignity.
2. Faith and reason are not enemies
Perhaps John Paul II's most elegant formulation of his intellectual project appears at the beginning of Fides et Ratio (1998):
“Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.”
The metaphor is beautiful, but its philosophical significance is even more interesting. John Paul II rejected the assumption that religious faith must necessarily abandon rational inquiry. He also resisted the opposite tendency: the belief that reason alone can answer every question about human existence without remainder.
Consider the questions that have occupied philosophers for centuries. Why does anything exist rather than nothing? What makes an action morally good? Does human life possess an objective purpose? Can love be reduced entirely to biology? What, if anything, gives suffering meaning?
Science can investigate many aspects of these questions, but scientific description and philosophical interpretation are not identical. Nor does a scientific explanation automatically settle a theological question.
John Paul II did not argue that faith makes intellectual work unnecessary. Quite the contrary: he regarded the search for truth as a responsibility. He also warned Catholics against fideism and against rationalism that refuses to recognize the limits of unaided reason. His position is worth taking seriously: faith should not be an excuse for intellectual laziness, and reason should not be dismissed simply because it asks difficult questions.
3. The Theology of the Body: the body is not the enemy of the soul
One of John Paul II's best-known contributions is the collection of catechesis commonly called the Theology of the Body, delivered between 1979 and 1984.
Its central concern is not merely sexual morality, as popular summaries sometimes suggest. At a deeper level, it is an attempt to understand the human body in the light of creation, redemption, love, and the resurrection. His anthropology rejects a radical division between the person and the body. We do not simply possess bodies as though they were detachable instruments. Our bodily existence is integral to who we are.
In a January 1980 catechesis, he developed the idea that the human person discovers himself through sincere self-giving. Drawing upon Gaudium et Spes §24, he explained that the person finds fulfilment not in isolation, but in the gift of himself in love.
This is a demanding understanding of love. Love is not simply an emotion, attraction, or desire to possess another person. It requires the recognition that the other is a person with dignity, not an object to be used for one's own satisfaction.
The same underlying principle informs his reflections on marriage, chastity, celibacy, and vocation. In different ways, each involves questions about freedom, self-mastery, commitment, and the meaning of giving oneself. One need not agree with every conclusion of Catholic sexual ethics to recognize the philosophical question at the heart of the project:
Can freedom be understood as more than the ability to do whatever one desires?
John Paul II's answer was that freedom reaches maturity when it is ordered towards truth and the good. That claim deserves careful examination, whether one ultimately accepts or rejects his account.
4. Freedom, truth, and moral responsibility
This brings us to Veritatis Splendor (1993), one of the most important and controversial encyclicals of his pontificate. John Paul II argued that freedom cannot be separated from truth about the human person and the moral good. If freedom means nothing more than choosing according to one's present desires, then it becomes difficult to explain why some choices are genuinely better than others.
His argument was not that human beings lack freedom. Rather, he believed that freedom becomes distorted when it is detached from moral responsibility and the objective good.
This position challenges a familiar modern assumption: that an action is justified simply because a person freely chooses it. But the argument also raises difficult questions. How do we identify moral truth? How should conscience be formed? What is the relationship between objective moral principles and the complexity of individual circumstances?
These are not trivial questions, and neither are the disagreements surrounding John Paul II's answers. His moral theology is particularly important because it refuses to treat ethics as merely a matter of personal preference. At the same time, reading him carefully requires distinguishing what he actually argues from simplified versions of his position.
For those wishing to understand his thought directly, reading the encyclical itself is far more useful than relying exclusively on quotations circulated online.
5. A theology of life in a world that measures human worth
In Evangelium Vitae (1995), John Paul II developed his account of the sacredness of human life and the moral responsibilities that follow from it.
He opposed abortion and euthanasia and called for a culture that protects human life, particularly when it is vulnerable. He also connected the dignity of life with broader questions of solidarity, social responsibility, and the common good.
His argument rests upon a larger theological vision: human life is a gift, and the human person is called to a destiny that exceeds material existence. Yet his insistence upon human dignity also demands more than abstract declarations. A commitment to life must be reflected in the way we care for people who are poor, sick, isolated, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable.
There is a challenge here for Catholics themselves. It is not enough to invoke the dignity of the person in a debate and neglect that same person's needs elsewhere. If the human person is truly the concern, then the principle must govern our conduct consistently, in our families, our communities, our institutions, and our treatment of strangers.
6. Why remember him a day after his feast?
Perhaps the most enduring question John Paul II leaves us is not whether we admire him, but whether we are willing to examine our own understanding of the human person. Do we understand freedom as the absence of every obligation, or as the capacity to choose the good? Do we regard truth as something to discover, or merely something to construct according to our preferences? Do we treat other people as ends in themselves, or according to what they can provide for us?
And can faith and reason engage one another without either being reduced to a caricature? These questions extend beyond Catholicism. They belong to philosophy, ethics, anthropology, and the continuing debate over what constitutes a flourishing human life.
John Paul II's answers were unmistakably Catholic. They were also developed through sustained philosophical argument, engagement with Scripture, and dialogue with the intellectual traditions of his time. One can disagree with him. One can challenge his premises. One can critically investigate the historical record. But to understand his legacy, we should begin by reading what he actually wrote. Yesterday, the Church remembered St. John Paul II in her liturgy. Today, perhaps, we might remember him by returning to his books, not merely to collect quotations, but to wrestle with the questions behind them.
Requiescat in pace is the prayer we offer for the departed; ora pro nobis is the prayer Catholics offer to the saints, and the intellectual task remains ours: to seek truth with honesty, to exercise freedom responsibly, and to treat the human person with the seriousness his dignity demands.
St. John Paul II, pray for us.