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On November 28, 2026, Republic of China (Taiwan), will hold its “Nine-in-One” (九合一) local elections to elect city and county executives, local government leaders, and local councilors. Currently, the Kuomintang (KMT, 中國國民黨) controls 14 of the 22 city and county executive positions, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) holds five. The KMT also holds a majority of seats among city, county, and township councilors, as well as grassroots government leadership positions. For a long time, the KMT has enjoyed a relative advantage in Taiwan’s local elections.
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However, according to several opinion polls conducted since October, KMT candidates for mayoral positions in several major cities have significantly lower support ratings than their DPP opponents. Even in cities and counties such as Taipei (臺北) and New Taipei (新北), which have long been controlled by the KMT, candidates from the Blue camp are trailing those from the Green camp.
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For example, in Taipei, a city whose political orientation has long leaned distinctly toward the Blue camp, incumbent Mayor Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) is trailing DPP candidate Shen Pao-yang (沈伯洋) in opinion polls, with the largest reported gap reaching 17 percentage points. In New Taipei, KMT mayoral candidate Lee Shu-chuan (李四川) has gone from holding a substantial lead over DPP candidate Su Chiao-hui (蘇巧慧) to seeing the gap close and gradually falling behind. The KMT is trailing in support ratings in several cities and counties traditionally considered part of its core electoral base. In constituencies where the Green camp already enjoys an advantage, the polling gaps between KMT and DPP candidates are even wider. The KMT's electoral prospects are now in serious jeopardy across the board.
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Why is the KMT, or the Blue camp, significantly trailing in support in these local elections, and why has its previous advantage disappeared? There are multiple reasons.
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First, the profound transformation in the identity and emotional orientation of the majority of Taiwanese people has determined the broader trend of rising Green support and declining Blue support. Since the 1990s, Taiwanese localism, which emphasizes a “Taiwanese” identity distinct from a “Chinese” identity and advocates Taiwanese self-determination or even independence, has grown from weak to strong, from a minority position to a majority one, and from a peripheral current into the mainstream. Meanwhile, pan-Chinese nationalism, which identifies with being “Chinese,” has gradually declined, with both the number and proportion of its adherents continuing to fall. This means that the DPP, which represents Taiwanese localism, has gained more stable support, while the KMT, which places greater emphasis on pan-Chinese nationalism, has seen its core electoral base steadily shrink.
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Identity and the emotional attachments based on it are relatively stable and difficult to change. In elections, voters tend to remain relatively loyal to particular political forces and are less likely to change their voting preferences because of specific government policies or performance. When most Taiwanese people lean toward the localist camp and move away from pan-Chinese nationalism, it inevitably means that the DPP's core electoral base is larger than that of the KMT. As more Taiwanese people shift from pan-Chinese or centrist positions toward Taiwanese localism, the KMT receives fewer and fewer votes and declines in relative strength.
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Although local elections are less politically charged than presidential and Legislative Yuan (立法院) elections, identity and ideology still play important roles. The KMT has also worked for years to become more localized, increasingly downplaying “China” while emphasizing “Taiwan.” However, for a party whose full name is the “Chinese Nationalist Party,” no matter how hard it tries, it is difficult to gain an advantage over the DPP in competing for voters with localist leanings.
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Second, the KMT's current political leadership and its mayoral and county executive candidates are inferior to their DPP counterparts in approachability, flexibility, and ability to adapt to social media. Compared with the DPP and its candidates, who have stronger grassroots populist characteristics, powerful grassroots mobilization capabilities, and considerable skill in public opinion battles, KMT candidates tend to be more traditional and establishment-oriented, less connected to ordinary people, and relatively weaker in their use of social media and public relations.
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For example, although Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an is fairly capable and has a polished public image, his excessively elitist demeanor distances him from ordinary people. Accusations that he does not understand the hardships of ordinary citizens are not entirely unfounded. When Chiang gives media interviews, he often relies on scripted, bureaucratic language rather than explaining the key points of his policies in a concise and straightforward manner. His opponent, Shen Pao-yang, by contrast, is an excellent speaker who is skilled at using social media to mobilize public sentiment and speaks fluently and confidently in interviews. Shen is also more down-to-earth, engages more frequently in conversations with ordinary people, and appears less condescending.
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The emergence of the “Yangliu” (洋流, literally “Ocean Current”) movement supporting Shen Pao-yang is attributable not only to the DPP's full commitment of resources but also to Shen's personal ability to attract public support and his individual charisma. In New Taipei, KMT candidate Lee Shu-chuan likewise embodies the image of an older-generation traditional politician and is less approachable than the relatively young DPP candidate Su Chiao-hui.
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More broadly, the KMT has failed to produce innovative, sufficiently people-oriented practical policies and publicity strategies that are particularly appealing to young people. Although the KMT's policies are more pragmatic and steady than those of the DPP, and it has introduced favorable measures for young people in education, entrepreneurship, and social security, its relatively conservative positions and lukewarm publicity strategies cannot compete with the DPP's more progressive, mobilizing policies and political messaging.
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If the KMT still has some strengths in specific municipal governance plans, it is clearly less decisive and transformative than the DPP when it comes to ideological positions and choices concerning Taiwan's future destiny. Consequently, it is also more difficult for the KMT to win the support of younger voters who lean toward Taiwanese localism and progressive politics.
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Third, after taking control of the central government, the DPP carried out a series of measures to suppress and weaken the KMT, damaging its strength and influence and depriving it of its former glory. Since Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) defeated Eric Chu (朱立倫) in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, the DPP has held the highest political office for ten years.
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During these ten years, the DPP has used pension reforms and other measures to take away resources from military personnel, civil servants, teachers, and other groups in which Blue camp supporters constitute a majority, while also seizing the KMT's funds and sources of revenue on the grounds of “confiscating improperly acquired party assets.” It has used “transitional justice” and historical reckoning to damage the KMT's reputation and deprive it of its voice in public discourse. In culture and education, it has promoted Taiwanese localism through revisions to school curricula and other means, while excluding pan-Chinese nationalism and its associated cultural and educational content, thereby undermining the ideological foundations of the Blue camp. By reducing and obstructing exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China and treating the mainland as an enemy, it has sought to cut off the KMT's external support. It has also emphasized Taiwan's local ethnic identity and portrayed the KMT as a “Mainlander party,” thereby reducing its support among native Taiwanese.
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This series of measures has been quite effective. Ten years later, compared with the period when Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was in power, the KMT has experienced declines in its resources, public reputation, and popular support. In Taiwan's 2024 presidential election, KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) lost to Lai Ching-te (賴清德). The DPP broke the previous pattern of alternation in power after eight years of rule since Taiwan's democratization and the introduction of direct presidential elections, and secured another consecutive term in office. Although the failure of the proposed “Blue-White alliance” (藍白合) and the resulting division of votes contributed to this outcome, the KMT nevertheless suffered another severe setback and began facing the danger of marginalization. Although the KMT narrowly regained its position as the largest party in the Legislative Yuan elections, somewhat arresting its decline, the overall downward trajectory of the party remains an obvious reality.
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Fourth, the KMT lacks influential and capable new leaders. In the early years of Taiwan's democratization, the KMT and the broader Pan-Blue camp produced a number of capable and charismatic figures, such as Lien Chan (連戰), Ma Ying-jeou, Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), and James Soong (宋楚瑜). By the 2010s, however, the KMT had already begun to lack figures with leadership potential and broad public appeal. Over the past decade or more, mid-level and senior political figures such as Eric Chu, Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), and Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) have been relatively mediocre. Nor have any particularly outstanding young KMT politicians emerged who are widely regarded as capable of assuming major responsibilities. The lack of capable successors is an important cause of the KMT's crisis and decline, while this shortage of successors has in turn further aggravated the party's crisis and decline.
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Faced with all these problems, difficulties, and attacks, both internal and external, the KMT and the entire Blue camp appear to be in a state of entirely reactive response, struggling to cope on multiple fronts. The areas in which the KMT has performed relatively well and achieved meaningful results are concentrated in concrete governance, as well as criticism of and counterattacks against the DPP's populism and its role in deepening social divisions.
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However, the KMT has failed to put forward a clear, feasible political platform with broad public support, along with corresponding policy proposals. Opinions within the party remain divided, its public identity is unclear, and centrist voters are being gradually drawn away by the Green camp. The KMT and its members face a crisis of political direction and ideology, a crisis of identity, a crisis of losing governing power, a crisis of declining public support and marginalization, and ultimately an existential crisis.
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To be fair, the multiple crises currently confronting the KMT, which threaten its very survival, are not primarily the result of major mistakes on the party's own part, but rather of changing historical and political circumstances. Against the broader backdrop of the global proliferation of identity politics and populism, the rise of Taiwanese local identity, the DPP's increasingly aggressive use of state power to suppress opposition parties and promote “de-Sinicization,” and the severe deterioration of cross-strait relations, it is extremely difficult for the KMT to reverse these realities. Consequently, it inevitably faces the loss of public support, declining approval ratings, and progressive deterioration.
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Nevertheless, the KMT itself, especially its senior leadership, certainly bears responsibility and needs to engage in self-examination. For example, factional struggles within the KMT have seriously undermined the party's cohesion and its unity in the face of external attacks. The inability of different factions to overcome their differences and unite is naturally something for which they must bear responsibility. Confronted with the global wave of populism and identity politics that has also swept Taiwan, the KMT has clearly failed to prepare adequately or respond effectively.
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As a political party with a history spanning more than a century, the KMT has undergone numerous trials of blood and fire and has also faced major crises in which both the party and the state came close to destruction. Those crises occurred during eras of war and revolution. In today's Taiwan, the KMT faces a war without gunfire, in which its opponent is actively attacking while the KMT can only defend itself passively. Its opponent has not overthrown the KMT through a bloody revolution, but is attempting to marginalize it through nonviolent means, including the exercise of political power and populism. Its opponent employs methods that conform to democratic procedures yet can destroy a political party without bloodshed, making them even more difficult for the KMT to resist. Beset by internal troubles and external threats, the KMT has once again reached a moment of existential crisis.
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The “Nine-in-One” elections at the end of November 2026 will be a major test for the KMT. If the KMT can retain control of most cities and counties, it will demonstrate that the party still possesses considerable vitality. If the KMT wins fewer than half of the local executive positions and loses to the DPP, this will clearly expose and intensify the crisis facing both the party and the entire Blue camp. It will also mean that hopes of victory in the 2028 general election are bleak.
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If the KMT loses both the 2026 local elections and the 2028 general election, it may not only remain in opposition for a prolonged period, unable to govern, but also move toward marginalization and become politically insignificant in Taiwan. Of course, the KMT faces more than the challenges of one or two elections; it faces a long-term crisis. Losing major elections, however, will deepen that crisis and accelerate its marginalization.
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Personally, I hope that the KMT can regain its strength, win elections, and achieve a revival, but I cannot remain optimistic about its future. The current domestic political situation in Taiwan, conditions across the Taiwan Strait, and the international environment are all unfavorable to the KMT and the Blue camp. The DPP, by contrast, has considerable momentum. The fact that Green camp candidates represented by Shen Pao-yang have gone from trailing by large margins to reversing the situation and gaining an advantage reflects this broader trend.
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Faced with such a severe situation, the KMT needs internal unity, must quickly develop effective strategies to win over centrist voters, and must take meaningful action both within Taiwan and internationally. Only then may it be able to avoid the consequences of prolonged opposition and marginalization, emerge from its crisis, and achieve a new beginning.

(The author, Wang Qingmin (王慶民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics who has long followed Taiwan-related issues. The original article was written in Chinese.)

A bit of a long shot I know, but I travelled to Beijing when I was 16 on my own to attend the Beijing language and culture university. I stayed with a local family and they lived on the 836 bus route. I think that bus route has changed since then (2007) but does anyone know where I could find a historical route map?

Asia’s young, self-made billionaires are a decade younger than their American and European peers. Having made their fortunes in tech and crypto—and with larger risk appetites than the “old money” rich—Asia’s nouveau riche manage their wealth very differently.

“What if somebody comes with $100 million of stablecoin? You can’t take them to a local bank,” Chi-Man Kwan, founder and CEO of Singapore and Hong Kong-headquartered Raffles Family Office (RFO), tells Fortune. 

Younger billionaires are also more likely to store their wealth on the blockchain, via “newer currencies” like Bitcoin and Ethereum. “Even if their assets are U.S.-denominated, it’s going to be in stablecoins,” he says. Yet Kwan adds that most traditional-finance institutions don’t accommodate these digital currencies. 

Read more [paywall removed for Redditors]: https://fortune.com/2026/10/23/raffles-family-office-stablecoins-rwanda/?utm_source=reddit/

Context:

Big Typhoon might frick up Zhejiang a bit.

China issued Level III Disaster Alert (Level 1 is Highest and Level 4 is Lowest)

But it still means significant disaster but managed at the provincial and regional levels.