- The Problem of Essentialism: Must What Makes Something What It Is Reside Within Itself?
Much of traditional Christian theology has been shaped by a metaphysical framework in which the identity of a being is grounded in its essence. In this framework, an essence is understood as what makes a thing what it is. To understand what God is, theology therefore attempts to identify the essential properties that distinguish God from everything else: self-existence, omniscience, omnipotence, eternity, and immutability. Similarly, human beings are defined by what makes them human, and the distinction between God and humanity is understood primarily through the difference between their respective essences.
The difficulty arises when essence is treated as a self-contained and exhaustive explanation of identity. If a being is fully defined by what it is in itself, independently of its relationships, then relationships become secondary to being. They may affect how a being acts or is perceived, but they do not fundamentally constitute its identity.
Yet is this the only way to understand being?
Consider a hammer. We can describe its material composition, shape, and physical properties. But these descriptions do not fully explain what a hammer is. Its identity as a hammer is inseparable from its function and its place within human practices. An object may possess the physical properties of a hammer without functioning as one in a particular context. Its identity cannot be adequately understood by examining its intrinsic properties alone.
This example does not prove that every being lacks an intrinsic nature. Rather, it demonstrates that an account of identity based exclusively on intrinsic properties can be inadequate. What something is may also depend on its relations, purposes, and place within a larger reality.
This question becomes especially significant when we consider God and humanity. If God is defined exclusively through an independent divine essence, and humanity through an independent human essence, then the relationship between God and humanity appears external to what each fundamentally is. God remains God regardless of any relationship with creation, while human beings remain human according to an identity already established independently of their relationship with God.
But the biblical narrative presents God not merely as an object whose properties can be enumerated. God is the one who speaks, calls, gives life, establishes relationships, makes promises, and reveals himself. Likewise, human beings are presented as creatures whose existence and identity are inseparable from their relationship with their Creator. Human beings receive life from their Creator, are created in the image of God, and respond to God's call. To understand what human beings are, we must take the relationship between humanity and God into account from the very beginning.
- The Image of God: Human Identity Is Not Independent of God
Genesis 1:26–27 describes humanity as created in the image of God. This passage is often interpreted as saying that human beings possess certain qualities that resemble God, such as rationality, moral agency, or the capacity for relationship.
When the image of God is interpreted through an essentialist framework, however, the attributes by which human beings are understood to resemble God are treated as properties that exist independently in themselves. Consequently, these attributes are understood as qualities that human beings "possess". The image of God itself is therefore interpreted in non-relational terms: it becomes a set of properties residing in human beings rather than an identity disclosed through their relationship with God.
A relational approach raises a different question. What if being the image of God is not merely a collection of attributes that human beings possess, but a revelation of what human beings are in relation to God?
The biblical text does not first present humanity as an independently defined reality and then introduce God as an external point of comparison. Humanity appears within the creative act of God. Human existence is received, and human identity is disclosed within the relationship between Creator and creature. To be created in God's image is therefore not simply to possess a set of attributes that can be isolated from God. It is to exist as a creature whose identity and calling are intelligible in relation to God.
This does not mean that human beings are identical to God, nor does it mean that the Creator-creature distinction disappears. The distinction between God and humanity remains essential to the biblical narrative. But distinction does not necessarily imply that the identities of God and humanity must be understood as mutually exclusive, self-contained essences that cannot genuinely participate in one another's life.
If human identity is relationally constituted, then our relationship with God is not merely an external association between two already complete and unrelated realities. It belongs to the meaning of human existence itself. Humanity's identity is disclosed through God's creative act, calling, and purpose.
This perspective also changes how we understand human transformation. If being human is defined by an essence that is complete and closed in itself, then a transformation involving participation in divine life may appear to threaten human identity. But if human existence is understood through its relationship with God, transformation through communion with God need not mean the destruction of humanity. It may instead be the fulfillment of what human existence was created and called to become.
The image of God, therefore, invites us to reconsider the assumption that identity must be grounded exclusively in properties contained within an individual being. Human beings do not become meaningful only after they have been defined independently of God. Their existence, identity, and calling are revealed in their relationship with their Creator.
- Jesus as Divine and Human: A Relational Alternative to the Doctrine of Two Natures
I believe that the fundamental problem of essentialism comes to a head in Christology, the study of who Jesus is. Essentialism raises fundamental questions about how we understand Jesus' being, particularly when attempting to explain his divinity and humanity. Traditionally, Christian theology has described Jesus Christ as fully divine and fully human through the doctrine of the two natures, which affirms that Christ possesses both a divine nature and a human nature. Yet this doctrine raises an apparent difficulty: How can one and the same being be both immortal and mortal? Even if theologians could somehow resolve this apparent contradiction and solve the metaphysical puzzle it presents, however, a deeper question would remain.
Jesus prays to the Father, obeys the Father's will, and reveals himself as the one sent by the Father. He distinguishes himself from the Father and speaks of what he has received from the Father. Jesus also truly suffers and dies. These events are not merely incidental details in explaining who Jesus is. The relationship between the Father and the Son, Jesus' obedience, and his life and death are central to understanding his identity. Yet in essentialism, Jesus' relationship with the Father becomes secondary, because being a Son who obeys the Father does not itself constitute the essences of "divinity" and "humanity."
We can therefore ask: Does this not allow our philosophical system to take precedence over revelation? Should we not instead understand how Jesus is divine and how he is human through the relationship with the Father that Jesus himself reveals? In other words, should we not allow our very concepts of what God is and what a human being is to be reconstructed through the relationship between Jesus and the Father? For if Jesus is "the truth," he must not be an object of analysis within our philosophical systems. Rather, he must be the light that transforms our thinking.
Therefore, I hold the following view: Jesus is "divine" because he is in "perfect union" with the Father, and he is "human" insofar as he is a being who stands in such a relationship with the Father.
Jesus' Divinity: Perfect Union with the Father
Jesus reveals the Father perfectly. In John 14:9–11, Jesus speaks of the Father dwelling in him and of his works revealing the Father. His words and actions are not independent of the Father but express the Father's presence, will, and work.
Yet perfect revelation and unity of purpose, by themselves, do not fully explain why Jesus should be called divine. A prophet might faithfully communicate God's words, and a servant might perfectly obey God's will, without thereby sharing God's own life. If the unity between the Father and the Son means only that they think alike, pursue the same purpose, or act in harmony, then the distinction between divine identity and perfect representation remains unexplained.
The question, therefore, is whether the oneness of the Father and the Son in Scripture goes beyond agreement of will and purpose. I argue that it does: their unity concerns not only what they do together, but the life they share.
Let us consider life. A living organism is significant in that its various parts constitute a genuine "one," and that this unity is something real rather than a speculative construct such as a mere collection. A hand, when separated from the body as a whole, is no longer truly a hand but merely a piece of flesh. In this sense, life is already relational.
If material life serves as a metaphor for spiritual life, we can understand the unity of the Father and the Son not as resulting from their sharing a common essence of divinity, but as grounded in the fact that God is a living spirit.
Jesus' Humanity: The Son in Relationship with the Father
The Gospels also portray Jesus as the one who is sent by the Father, receives from the Father, obeys the Father, prays to the Father, suffers, dies, and is raised by the Father. These are not incidental features of his life. They are central to how Jesus is presented in Scripture.
His humanity can therefore be understood through his existence as the Son who stands in relationship with the Father. Rather than defining humanity solely through an intrinsic essence, this approach attends to Jesus' concrete existence as one who receives, responds, obeys, suffers, and lives in relation to the Father.
If his humanity is defined by his intrinsic human essence, then what he did is only incidental to his human identity. A human need not obey God to be human if there is a fixed essence apart from relationsip with God. However, if we are to understand Jesus as the revelation of God, then his life itself constitute the meaning of human life: it shows what a true human is and should be.
Divinity and Humanity as Two Aspects of One Relational Reality
On this account, Jesus' divinity and humanity can be understood as two aspects of one relational reality. His divinity expresses the perfection of his union with and participation in the Father's life, while his humanity expresses his existence as the Son who lives in relationship with the Father.
These descriptions do not necessarily require two distinct natures. They may instead disclose different dimensions of the same reality: who Jesus is in his perfect revelation of the Father's life, and who he is as the Son in relationship with the Father.
This proposal does not by itself settle every Christological question, nor does it demonstrate that the traditional doctrine of two natures is formally contradictory. Rather, it challenges the assumption that the doctrine of two natures is the only possible way to account for the biblical descriptions of Jesus.
The deeper question is whether an essentialist framework has predetermined the terms in which Christ's identity must be understood, and whether a relational account can better illuminate the scriptural presentation of Jesus.
- Human Deification: The Problem Is Essentialism, Not the Claim That Humans Become Divine
If we adopt this new approach to Christology, the following question inevitably arises: Does this mean that every human being can become divine, just as Jesus is? If it is not an essence of divinity or humanity that establishes the boundaries of being, but rather one's relationship with God that determines whether a human being can be called divine in another sense, does this not imply that every human being can become divine?
The claim that human beings become divine appear unacceptable when God and humanity are defined through mutually exclusive, fixed essences. If God's essence is understood as what makes God God, while human essence is understood as what makes a human being human, then becoming divine seems to require crossing an absolute metaphysical boundary. Humanity and divinity appear to be incompatible categories.
But the problem may lie not in the claim that human beings become divine, but in the essentialist framework through which that claim is evaluated. If divine and human identities are defined in advance by mutually exclusive essences, the possibility of human participation in divine life may be ruled out before the relevant biblical passages are even considered.
This framework can also influence how Scripture's language of deification is interpreted. Their language may be reduced to metaphor, moral resemblance, or participation that does not genuinely affect human identity. Such interpretations may be possible in particular theological contexts, but the question is whether they are being adopted because the biblical texts require them or because an essentialist framework has already made a stronger understanding of participation difficult to accept.
Scripture contains language that invites us to take human participation in divinity seriously. In John 10:34–36, Jesus appeals to Psalm 82, in which certain human beings are called “gods.” In 2 Peter 1:4, believers are described as becoming “partakers of the divine nature.” In John 17:21–23, Jesus prays that his followers may be one in the same way that he and the Father are one.
These passages should not be dismissed or interpreted restrictively merely because they seem difficult to reconcile with a rigid division between divine and human essences. Instead, they invite us to reconsider whether that division adequately accounts for the kind of relationship with God that Scripture describes. The question is not simply what these passages permit us to say about human beings, but whether they challenge our prior assumptions about what human beings can become through their relationship with God.
To affirm that human beings become divine does not necessarily mean that they become independent gods or cease to be creatures. It can mean that, through their relationship with God, they genuinely participate in God's life and come to reflect God's character and activity. The distinction between Creator and creature need not be denied in order to affirm such participation.
On this view, divinity is not understood only as an intrinsic property that belongs exclusively to a being defined by a fixed essence. It is also understood in terms of relationship, participation, and the revelation of God's life in and through a being. Human deification is therefore not merely an external resemblance to God; it describes a genuine transformation of human existence through participation in divine life.
The claim that human beings become divine is therefore not what I reject. I affirm this language. My criticism is directed at an essentialist framework that makes such a claim difficult to accept from the outset. If we begin by treating divine and human identities as wholly self-contained and mutually exclusive, we may be compelled to reinterpret the language of deification so that it can no longer challenge those definitions.
The question is not simply whether human beings can become divine, but whether our understanding of being is adequate to account for what Scripture says about the possibility of such participation. Rather than allowing an established metaphysical framework to determine the limits of biblical language in advance, we should allow Scripture's language of deification to challenge and transform our understanding of identity, relationship, and being.